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Foreword
Rehana Azam
National Secretary, GMB
“ As the coronavirus first burned through exploited workplaces and threadbare public services, Boris Johnson pledged to extend the 
Government’s ‘arms around every single worker.’
For millions of workers, the warm words left a bitter taste. 
Perhaps, in moments of quiet contemplation, the Prime Minister does 
reflect upon the thousands of jobs that were needlessly lost due to an 
ideological refusal to extend additional support to the sectors most in 
need. 
But I doubt it. 
He might also reflect on his refusal to extend full income protection to 
the lowest paid workers.
Or the Treasury’s now ritualistic warning that, while the public clapped 
the heroic workers in our health and care services, real-term pay cuts 
would follow.
The Prime Minister’s words have always been more impressive than 
what follows.
What it will really take to level up
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Who can forget the phantom ‘forty new hospitals,’ which turned out to 
be six? 
Or the ‘levelling-up’ agenda, which seems to consist of Ministers 
awarding funding to each others’ constituencies – while local authority 
leaders in the Midlands and the North are kept in the dark?
This isn’t just a gap between Boris Johnson’s rhetoric and reality. There 
is a chasm. 
But why should we expect better from a Prime Minister whose answer 
to public sector pay demands was to cut jobs, and who once described 
a £250,000 salary as ‘chicken feed’?
Or who dismissed the demands of the Black Lives Matters movement 
as the products of a ‘sense of victimisation’?
And who even now – after ten years of cruel austerity – have no plans 
for rebuilding our exhausted, underpaid, and overstretched public 
services.
The truth is that the politicians that govern this country cannot 
understand the anxieties and hopes of ordinary working people because 
they have never walked a mile in their shoes.
And the fight has only just begun. 
The coronavirus has ruthlessly exposed the structural inequalities in 
our society. Where there is poverty, prejudice, and discrimination, the 
virus has left a trail of broken lives in its wake. We cannot rest until those 
divides have been closed.
What it will really take to level up
What it will really take to level up
And we know that whatever politicians claim, they are determined that a 
new that wave of austerity will follow.  
The answer is the same as it has always been. Social advances will 
never be handed down to us. They will only be won by the industrial and 
political strength of the workers’ organisations.
We cannot change the past, but we can honour the dead by winning a 
better tomorrow. As Will Thorne, the founder of the GMB union that I am 
so proud to represent, once said – inequality is not inevitable:
‘While there is breath and life in me, I shall continue the fight … there is a 
world of freedom, beauty and equality to gain.’  
That better world can be had if we have the courage to fight for it. And 
as we prepare for the battles ahead, we should draw strength from one 
of the clarion calls of our movement – deeds, not words. ”
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Introduction
Inequality in the UK has gone from bad to worse. The economic gap 
between UK regions is the starkest of any comparable developed nation- 
but this is not where our inequality problem starts or ends.1  Whether 
it be inequalities between groups, between regions, within regions, in 
wealth or in who has power and who doesn’t, the conclusion is the same 
– the UK is one of the most unequal rich countries in the world. And 
these inequalities are deadly. Covid-19 infections and death have been 
marked by race and ethnicity, by education, by the level of deprivation 
and by geography. Pre-existing inequalities are continuing to shape who 
dies and who lives, just as the pandemic itself creates new disparities.
Dr Faiza Shaheen
We are somehow achieving Grand Prix speeds, but without firing on 
all cylinders…We need now to level up, not to neglect our capital of 
course not, but to put in the infrastructure that will lift every region, 
Northern Powerhouse rail, proper connectivity in the West Midlands.
“
A lockdown is a lockdown – just because it’s a local lockdown doesn’t 
stop the operating costs being what they were under the national 
lockdown, so why is this support so much less? This is a northern 
intervention and they think they can get away with doing it on the 
cheap. That’s the beginning and end of it.
“
Boris Johnson, Prime Minister, 12th June 2019
Jim McMahon, MP for Oldham West and Royton, 9 October 2020
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Given this background, a government that puts ‘levelling up’ at the heart 
of its policy agenda may sound like the right match. Boris Johnson 
started off his premiership promising to ‘level up’ the UK – addressing 
the woes of the ‘left behind’ regions and towns within them. It is a 
worthy focus. But from a policy standpoint the agenda is flawed in 
design. Regional inequalities are not divorced from other types of 
inequalities, from the macro economy nor from poverty. As such, 
regional inequalities cannot be tackled alone. More than a year since 
becoming Prime Minister, and almost 12 months from gaining an 80-
seat majority on the basis of delivering Brexit and ‘levelling up’ the UK – 
we still have no plan on how the UK will solve its regional inequalities, let 
alone other types of inequality.
The government hasn’t just failed to invest, they have contradicted their 
‘level up’ agenda again and again. They have used the cover of Covid-19 
and suspended rules of procurement to give rich friends and relatives 
contracts worth billions of pounds;2 voted against free school meal 
vouchers for children living in poverty during the half term holidays; and, 
shown blatant disregard of political leaders in cities across the Midlands 
and the North when planning responses to Covid-19 lockdowns.
The papers in this report – covering regional investment, wages, 
industrial strategy, devolution, education, race, health, transport and tax 
– highlight the gap between the need and the policies that have been put 
in place, but also go further to populate a policy agenda that really could 
deliver equality in the UK.
This report is published on the eve of the Spending Review – one that 
the Chancellor, Rishi Sunak, promises will focus on economic recovery. 
There are already misleading headlines and talk of the need to pay back 
the public debt that has accumulated because of the Covid-19, this is 
the wrong path. The last ten years of austerity have not just undermined 
public services and damaged as socially but has failed on its own 
economic terms. There must be a clear break from this approach, with 
a focus on stimulating good jobs. Sunak would also be wrong to think 
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only of short-term measures that keep a lop-sided boat afloat. Without 
a longer-term plan now, the best case scenario is that we return to the 
old normal. A normal that left millions in insecure employment, tens 
of thousands queuing at food banks and thousands sleeping on our 
streets.
Key Findings
Across these seemingly diverse papers are reoccurring themes which 
can be summed up under nine headings:
‘Levelling up’ does not exist in any meaningful sense in terms of 
policy, resource or outcome.
Since first used by Boris Johnson in July 2019, the stated headline aim 
of ‘levelling up’ is largely used as a rhetorical instrument.3 Beyond the 
government’s Stronger Towns and Future High Streets funds, with some 
commitment to infrastructure spending in the March 2020 Budget, little 
detail has emerged on a concrete plan to level up Britain.4 There is yet 
to be any real substance behind the term, nor has it been used as an 
organising principle for policy. As such, from a policy perspective it is an 
empty slogan.
Moreover, there is an incoherency within the term. On education, Raey’s 
paper points out that logically it is not helpful to talk about ‘levelling up’ 
in education when it would be impossible for the state to compete with 
the funds available to those who attend private school. Can we really 
all ‘level up,’ or will some – most notably the wealthiest – have to also 
‘level down?’ Logically, and as Sikka outlines on his paper on financing 
‘levelling up,’ some redistribution is necessary. Yet there is no discussion 
of this necessity in any government outputs in regard to ‘levelling up.’
A more cynical reading of the ‘levelling up’ agenda is that it was invented 
purely as a way to gain and retain the support of Northern voters. As 
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a political tool, it is being used to erase and delegitimise other types of 
inequality, most notably gender and race. As such, it could be seen as 
being part of the lexicon of a culture war that pits working class groups 
in the North and South against each other, distracting us from growing 
wealth concentrations at the top of society.
However cynical the reasons for use of the term, Johnson is now under 
real pressure to deliver on this agenda. The Conservative majority 
depends on holding on to seats traditionally held by Labour in northern 
England, the Midlands and Wales, which they seized after pledging 
to improve their areas.5 Without meaningful action to fill the current 
policy vacuum, people will start to notice and there will be political 
ramifications.
‘Levelling up’ defined purely in terms of regional inequality lacks 
credibility
To date, the ‘levelling up’ agenda has been framed largely as the 
need to tackle regional inequality and the North-South divide. While 
regional inequality in the UK is pronounced, such an agenda ignores 
inter-regional disparities, as well as the interlinkages between different 
forms of inequality – educational, health, racial and so on. As Jones et 
al. point out, even on an issue like transport the North-South divide is 
too reductive. In reality, there is not so much a North-South divide with 
public transport provision, as a metro-suburban/rural divide. Whether 
on education (Raey) or health (Chand), the inequalities within in regions 
are worse than those between regions. Raey reports that of the ten 
local districts with the highest percentage of Free School Meal (FSM) 
students, three are in London. London is also home to the highest levels 
of income inequality, with median full-time earnings 53 per cent above 
the UK average in Kensington & Chelsea in West London but just 3 per 
cent below it in Barking & Dagenham in East London.6   
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There is not just an issue of policy oversight, as McLeod makes clear on 
the issue of racial disparities – without addressing differences between 
groups and within regions there will be no ‘levelling up’ in any meaningful 
sense, and any efforts to address regional inequalities will ultimately fail.
The Conservatives have been levelling down the UK for the past 
decade
Across public services, public sector pay, job security or infrastructure 
– the Conservatives have spent the last decade either levelling down 
or failing to take opportunities to ‘level up’ the UK. After decades of 
deindustrialisation and a financial crisis which hit those outside London 
and the South East most, austerity made things much worse still. The 
most deprived local authorities have borne the brunt of austerity since 
2010, which has widened social and spatial inequalities. Jones et al. 
highlight that transport funding was almost £400 million a year lower 
in 2019 than it was a decade ago, with well over 3,000 local authority 
supported bus services have been lost or reduced.7 In health, Chand 
refers to the Marmot Review8 and it’s follow up,9 which found that the 
social gradient has become steeper over the last decade. In 2016-18, life 
expectancy in the least and most deprived areas differed by 9.5 years 
for men and 7.7 years for women in 2016-18, rising from 9.1 and 6.8 
respectively in 2010-12.10
Brexit uncertainty has further added to this levelling down. Research 
shows that the cost of Brexit uncertainty to date is unevenly distributed 
across the UK. In relative terms, by 2019, the West Midlands (-5.29%), 
Northern Ireland (-4.67%), the South West (-3.5%) and South East 
(-3.08%) appear to have lost most,11 highlighting that economic 
divergence between the UK’s regions may be exacerbated by the 
mismanagement of Brexit.
The cumulative effect of the Great Recession, austerity and then Brexit 
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uncertainty has profoundly damaged the social fabric of the country and 
further accelerated inequalities. The Bank of England’s chief economist 
described the last 10 years as a lost decade for wages12 (see Reed’s 
chapter), and austerity has been described by the UN as ‘callous,’ with 
huge consequences for the poorest in society.13
The Covid-19 pandemic has levelled the UK down further
It is not just that the Covid-19 has exposed the gaping inequalities in 
the UK, it has made the situation worse. In the labour market, after a 
decade of growth in the number of employees on zero-hour contracts, 
the economic fallout from Covid-19 has brought new insecurities. Take 
the ‘hire and re-fire’ tactics at British Airways and civil aviation, and the 
threatening of outsourcing of work by companies like Rolls Royce and 
Alexander Dennis. As Turner underlines in his paper on industry, there is 
a coordinated strategy of opportunism by some employers. Even where 
this is not driven by employer opportunism, economic uncertainty will 
result in more people on short term and zero-hour contracts. Rhetoric 
about ‘levelling up’ will be of little comfort to these and thousands of 
others either losing their jobs or seeing their rights downgraded.
Reay notes the long-term and ongoing levelling down of funding for 
schools in working class areas.  She reminds us that state schools in 
disadvantaged areas ‘are the most under-resourced; the most likely 
to have buckets collecting water from unrepaired roofs, to have food 
banks operating in their school halls, to have the narrowest curriculum, 
an impoverished pedagogy, the strongest focus on discipline, and the 
least SEND resources.’ She details how the Education Policy Institute 
(EPI) found that over the next year those on FSM they will see increases 
of 0.6% compared to increase of 1.1 % for non-FSM pupils, and over the 
last three years, FSM pupils have received increases of just two-thirds 
the rate of non-FSM pupils.
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On housing, homeless charity Shelter reported that 322,000 private 
renters have fallen into arrears since the pandemic started and that 
170,000 had been threatened with eviction. Meanwhile, exclusive estate 
agents managing properties over £15 million have seen an exponential 
growth in sales.15 We had a housing crisis going into the lockdown, and 
this has only worsened, with the gap between the housing haves and 
have nots widening.
The government has actively tried to level down London, by trying to 
scrap free travel for under-18s and put restrictions on Freedom Pass 
travel. These plans were thwarted, but there will be further discussions 
in 2021.16 Fears remain that the government could use the cover of 
Covid-19 to take away hard won rights for Londoners which make the 
city at least slightly more liveable for the working class.
McLeod writes about one of the most notable ways Covid-19 has 
exposed inequality – through the disproportionate deaths of black and 
brown people. The crisis has shown that racial discrimination is a social 
determinant of health. Even for people who survive the pandemic, the 
economic cost is going to be high. People and parents will be expected 
to spend money they might not have on IT equipment, software and 
broadband. Black, Bangladeshi and Pakistani households have 10p of 
wealth for every £1 a white person has and so are ill-equipped to deal 
with this impact. Again, the gap is widening.
Current funding being made available is a drop in the ocean, and risks 
leaving the UK lagging behind other EU nations
Sykes reports that a delay over launching the UK Shared Prosperity 
Fund (UKSPF), which are meant to at least match EU Structural Funds, 
is leaving left behind areas short changed and at risk of being levelled 
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down. Sykes also deems the Stronger Towns fund “a drop in the ocean” 
compared to what is needed, over-and-above compensating for the 
absence of EU regional investment funding. 
The issue is not just of replacing the regional funding lost from being in 
the EU, but of also keeping up with growing investment being spent on 
lagging EU regions. For example, on green stimulus the UK Government 
has announced £12bn of spending under a 10-point green plan,17 which 
is less than a third of the £36bn announced by the German government. 
More broadly, the EU already has a €700bn spending programme in 
place on top of existing budgets. Charles Michel, the Belgian president 
of the European Council, described the bloc’s goals as, ‘repairing the 
damage caused by Covid-19, reforming our economies, remodelling our 
societies.’
This isn’t the first attempt at ‘levelling up’
In both McInroy’s and Sykes papers we are reminded that Boris Johnson 
is not the first to have thought about tackling regional inequalities. 
Whether it be various regeneration attempts under the Blair and Brown 
governments, or Osborne’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’ – spatially targeted 
policy designed to alleviate inequalities is nothing new. However, very 
little seems to have been learnt from past failed attempts – especially 
in terms of the scale of change needed, the requirement to address the 
economic foundations of the UK, and the need to take an intersectional 
approach. 
We need structural change in our economy 
The problem is not simply one of public investment. Our economic 
model, and in particular our focus on financialisation, is key to 
understanding why we fail to level up. This model inevitable favours 
London, and without a break from this model we cannot fundamentally 
change the economic geography of the UK.
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Far from a trickling down of wealth from cities to outer towns, McInroy 
shows us that the regional hinterlands and areas outside of these city 
centres are more and more left behind, with towns such as Bolton, 
Wigan and Rochdale continuing to struggle despite the economic 
success of Manchester City Centre and other nearby growth hotspots. 
Turner reminds us of other fundamentals – that any ‘levelling up’ agenda 
must start with supporting well-paid unionised manufacturing jobs and 
utilising them as an anchoring point for raising the quality of work and 
prosperity for communities across all regions of our country. It is worth 
noting too, that a growing share of people work in social care, which is 
one of the lowest paid sectors in the country. Without a fundamental 
shift in how care work – mostly done by women – is treated we can 
never ‘level up.’ Regional economies are not divorced from the drivers of 
low pay nationally or internationally.
There is too much power concentrated in Westminster
The Prime Minister has pledged to ‘do devolution properly,’ promising to 
‘level up’ across every nation and region in the UK, providing support to 
towns and cities and closing the opportunity gap in our society but again 
and again Westminster shows it is not serious about deconcentrating 
power.   McInroy illuminates the on-going centralised system of power in 
the UK and its consequences. Without a fundamental shift in approach 
there can be no delivery of ‘levelling up,’ and even if any progress is made 
it will be undermined if people aren’t able to feel they had some say in 
change.
There is money to tackle the UK’s inequality problem 
Far from the talk of having to “balance the books” or be prudent with 
public spending, Sikka highlights the myriad of ways that are available to 
the government to raise money. These include government borrowing, 
changes to the capital gains tax rate, and given the absence of inflation 
– asking the Bank of England to print more money.
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Recommendations
Each chapter advocates a number of specific recommendations, but 
below we summarise the key pillars of an over-arching agenda that 
would deliver greater equality across the UK. This policy agenda cannot 
wait for Covid-19 to be over, and indeed, if implemented now would help 
us to recover sooner and better. Unite has warned of the tsunami of 
jobs which could be lost – and are already being lost – across industries 
from civil aviation and aerospace, to automotive and hospitality.19 Saving 
those jobs must be the starting point for government intervention but 
cannot be the end.
As Turner asserts, we start with the principle that the state has a 
responsibility to intervene strategically and transform our economy. 
We recognise that the below may not be easily adapted to three-word 
slogans, but if an agenda of equality addresses poverty; precariousness 
in the labour market; the uneven distribution of power; race, class, 
gender and disability prejudice; alongside issues of place-based 
disadvantages, then and only then, will the government keep its pledge 
to ‘level up’ the UK.
The government needs to stop treating inequality as a 
campaign slogan
Boris Johnson’s ‘levelling up’ agenda has quickly proven to be superficial. 
If the government is serious about addressing inequality between 
regions and speaking to the needs of left behind groups in the UK, it must 
take poverty and structural economic change far more seriously. The 
government must now stop governing via slogans and populate a policy 
agenda fit to address the root causes of inequalities across the UK.  
As McLeod suggests, if the government wants to develop a narrative 
to help deliver equality they should look closely at the divisive language 
they use to pit working class people in the North against those in the 
South, and which divides the working class as white and non-white. 
Rather than three-word slogans, they must popularise an appreciation 
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of the common barriers holding back working-class people across the 
country while increasing the understanding of the particular dynamics of 
race that impact upon people of colour. 
We need to eradicate poverty 
A common point made by many authors across this report is the 
immediate need for a poverty eradication programme. As Raey puts it, 
‘better, and less slippery, language than that of ‘levelling up’ would speak 
of two things: eradicating poverty across Britain, and secondly, the 
removal of all forms of special privilege in education.’ The fact is there 
can be no ‘levelling up’ without a robust set of policies to tackle growing 
poverty in the country.
A first step would be to make the £20 extra a week increase in universal 
credit permanent. Currently it is due to be withdrawn in March, which is 
also the point at which the extended furlough period will end. This will 
plunge thousands into poverty. The government must also make child 
benefit more generous, with an end to the two-child rule. Furthermore, a 
form of disability living payments for people with certain disabilities and 
illness should be reinstated and means-testing should be ended.
The CLASS 2020 Labour Market Realities report found that a quarter 
of adults are one month away from not being able to pay their rent or 
mortgage if they were to lose their jobs.20 Given the threat of a prolonged 
recession and job losses, welfare support will be critical to keeping 
poverty at bay and avoiding a new hit to those already left behind and 
marginalised in society.
We need more redistribution
Within the notion of ‘levelling up’ there is the mythical idea that everyone 
can move upwards and be at the “top.” This is simply illogical. We need 
more redistribution to tackle inequality. The national share of income 
of the richest 1 per cent of households has tripled over the last four 
decades from 3 per cent in the late 1970s to around 8 per cent.21 
In
tro
du
ct
io
n 
  1
7
What it will really take to level up
Around 10 per cent of households hold 44 per cent of all wealth, whilst 
the poorest 50 per cent own just 9 per cent.22 As Sikka underlines, 
redistribution to correct for this growing inequality could take form as 
a wealth tax, a financial transactions tax, land value tax, higher VAT on 
luxury goods, reforming capital gains tax, as well as a clampdown or tax 
avoidance and evasion.
We need to go big
In the past decade regional funding and public investment has taken 
several big hits including the Conservative Party’s policies of austerity 
and lost EU regional funding. Relatively small amounts of money will do 
very little to change current trends or make up for historical neglect.
Rather than £12 billion to fund a ’10-point green plan’ of which only £3 
billion is new money, the government needs to invest in line with need, 
akin to the approach post-World War II. To reach carbon targets spending 
on the climate emergency each year needs to increase to 2% of GDP in 
the short term, ramping up to 5% to deliver change at pace. We can start 
now with a minimum £100 billion green stimulus programme funded 
directly by government borrowing alongside a new National Investment 
Bank, backed up by a network of Regional Development Banks, to provide 
£250billion of lending for enterprise, infrastructure and innovation over 
ten years, e.g. expanding and electrifying our public transport systems 
and retrofitting our energy-inefficient homes.
As well as greening up the UK, tackling inequality for the 21st century 
means huge investment in broadband provision, in transport and 
technological developments. Without a huge injection of cash, the 
UK will at best stagnate, and this will ultimately mean we fall behind 
other industrial nations. We simply cannot tackle forty years of 
deindustrialisation and growing regional inequalities without large sums 
of public investment.
A green and care-led recovery, with a new industrial strategy 
Without an effort to rebuild manufacturing or recognise the importance 
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of social care there can be no rebalancing. Turner notes that this must 
be a coordinated strategy between the regions, and across industries 
and supply chains. Within this industrial strategy, there must be a 
defence of foundational industries. Turner advocates public ownership 
of industries such as steel, transport, communications and energy, 
which would form the foundations of an industrial strategy. However, we 
would be wrong to think only of traditional industries when rebuilding the 
economy. The Women’s Budget Group’s Commission on a Gender-Equal 
Economy recently launched a report making the case for the creation 
of a caring economy – an economy which values care, both paid and 
unpaid, as the activities that nurture us all.23
Particular attention must be paid to young people in any job creation 
programme as they are twice as likely to work in shut-down sectors. 
Short-term initiatives must have links to job creation planned through a 
bold new green industrial strategy and stimulus.
A National Recovery Council
Turner calls for a National Recovery Council (based on the National 
Economic Development Council that was abolished in 1992) to provide 
support to sectors of industry and involve trade unions. This would bring 
the experience and expertise of the trade unions from the shop floor 
into the highest levels of decision making to influence the long-term 
rebuilding of our economy.
Tackle low pay and job insecurity 
A common problem for all those struggling is low pay and job 
insecurity. In the short term, Rishi Sunak must continue the furlough 
scheme, while the health crisis rages on, to ensure people’s jobs and 
livelihoods. However, he cannot stop there. Fearmongering about higher 
government debt is ideological and thus should not stand in the way of 
increasing public sector pay. After a decade of real term cuts to public 
sector pay, as well as the sacrifices frontline workers have made during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, public sector workers deserve a pay rise. We 
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also need to ban zero hour contracts, end bogus self-employment, 
increase sick pay permanently and strengthen the law so that those who 
work regular hours for more than 12 weeks will have a right to a regular 
contract which reflects those hours. 
Ultimately, any motion to ‘enhance’ workers’ rights will be futile 
without the active involvement of trade unions and the proliferation of 
collective bargaining agreements. There is a whole host of evidence 
that trade unions and sectoral collective bargaining are fundamental in 
suppressing wage inequality and are associated with a whole range of 
in-work benefits such as increased worker wellbeing, job progression 
and productivity.24 Trade union density, which stood at 23.2 per cent 
in 2017, is at a record low, and only around one quarter of workers are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement.25 
The introduction of the National Living Wage in 2016 has confused the 
lexicon of wage legislation. The current National Living Wage is simply a 
minimum wage for adults calculated on the basis of a target of reaching 
66 per cent of median earnings by 2024. The Real Living Wage (RLW) 
is calculated in line with living costs, currently set at £9.30 across the 
UK and £10.75 in London. The RLW is significantly higher than both 
the minimum wage applied to those under 25 (currently £8.20) and the 
National Living Wage (£8.72). We need to move towards a Real Living 
Wage for all, setting a minimum wage guarantee reflecting the true costs 
of living to combat high and growing levels of in-work poverty. A pay rise 
for those on the lowest incomes has an added bonus – this is the group 
most likely to spend their money, generating further economic output.
Over the longer term, we need to start moving towards a four-day 
working week (without reducing pay). Chand points out that this would 
also be a public health measure as it ‘would reduce stress, give people 
back time to shop and cook healthy meals, sleep sufficiently, exercise 
regularly, dedicate to caring responsibilities and spend more time with 
their friends and families.’
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The introduction of a National Education Service
Unsurprisingly, Reed’s analysis of the drivers of regional wages 
disparities finds differences in education are in part to blame. To address 
skills imbalance and gaps we need a lifelong education system and 
workers must have the opportunity to up-skill and re-skill as our jobs and 
technologies develop. After a decade of cuts, local education institutions 
need to be properly resourced. Turner notes that apprenticeships must 
be high quality with a guarantee of work. This is critical if we are to give 
those not opting to go on to higher education a decent wage. Just as 
in Germany, the government must encourage large manufacturers to 
support highly skilled apprentices who can be released or seconded 
throughout the wider supply chain. 
We need more devolution
McInroy advocates a National Constitutional Convention to start the 
process of a shift in power away from London in a democratic and 
transparent way. New local tax powers should also be agreed, but only 
once an appropriate national redistribution method is established.
Adopt community wealth building across the whole city region. 
McInroy provides detailed insight on adopting community wealth 
models as a method to revitalisation of our local economies, 
particularly in sectors such as retail food supply, retail banking and 
telecommunications. He writes, “By harnessing the virtuous intent of 
local policymakers to embrace more democratic control and new forms 
of ownership, the power of the foundational economy could be genuinely 
unleashed, thereby creating a plethora of inclusive local economies 
for all.” Possible ways forward include a city region bank, city region 
companies – such as in construction, and localised green investment.
A Race Equality Act
The Government’s plans to level up based on geography will need both 
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universal and targeted approaches. Reed’s exploration of why there are 
regional wage gaps demonstrates that discrimination based on personal 
characteristics is part of the problem. We need a Race Equality Act, as 
recommended by Baroness Doreen Lawrence.26 This would enshrine a 
commitment to eliminating racial disparities, not merely monitoring them.
Give every citizen a say in their work places, in their 
communities and in policy
The draconian restrictions placed on unions by the Trade Union Act of 
2016 must be repealed immediately. Sectoral collective bargaining must 
be expanded and encouraged and pay should be included. This is the 
only way to distribute power into the hands of workers and give voice in 
the workplace.
Alongside greater democracy in the workplace we need to establish 
citizen assemblies. This will ensure a bottom-up approach to finding 
workable solutions and will help ensure policy responses are informed 
by the people bearing the brunt of inequality. McLoed reminds us that 
as our decision-making bodies are still mostly unrepresentative of the 
populations they administer, the routes for influencing policy from the 
grassroots need to be strengthened. Empowering citizens, in particular 
those who have been previously side-lined, is the critical building-block 
for meaningful and sustained change.
Alongside greater democracy in the workplace we need to establish 
citizen assemblies. This will ensure a bottom-up approach to finding 
workable solutions, and will help ensure policy responses are informed 
by the people bearing the brunt of inequality. McLoed reminds us that 
as our decision-making bodies are still mostly unrepresentative of the 
populations they administer, the routes for influencing policy from the 
grassroots need to be strengthened. Empowering citizens, in particular 
those who have been previously side-lined, is a critical building-block for 
meaningful and sustained change.
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Introduction
‘Levelling up’ is the latest idea in a long line of heralded attempts 
to address decades of longstanding inequality, and variations in 
economic performance across the country. ‘Levelling up’ has been 
in part prompted by the government winning new seats in the North 
- the so called ‘Red Wall.’ Yet, in reality, ‘levelling up’ does not exist in 
any meaningful policy, resource or outcome. Indeed, just five years 
ago, similar claims were made about devolution to some English city 
regions to deal with regional inequality. However, these confusing 
and varied devolution deals were disingenuous, framed by austerity, 
and with little regard for environmental, economic or social justice. 
The deals were embedded into an economic model prescribed by the 
Treasury and Whitehall, who continue to this day to hold all the cards. 
Indeed, since 2015, instead of giving local areas the proper powers to 
deliver prosperity, devolution has been used to pass the responsibility to 
Chapter 1
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deliver austerity. Hence, with the pandemic, and subsequent economic 
and social crises, we are going to have to take significant, new and 
profound action to address these longstanding divisions, confusing and 
ineffective sets of differing powers and responsibilities to safeguard the 
wellbeing of millions.  
Hence, this chapter considers and discusses how we solve the 
longstanding, deep and growing regional inequality. Firstly, this essay 
will explore the historic attempts to address this issue, with attention 
to the relatively recent focus on the regional city centres, and the perils 
of an economic model based on land and property appreciation.  The 
paper concludes by suggesting what it would really to take to address 
A brief history of failures to ‘level up.’
The UK, and particularly England, is one of the most highly centralised 
countries in the world. It also has longstanding and persistent 
geographical disparities in economic and social conditions and 
outcomes.1 The economic gap between London and the rest of the 
country has been in place for decades. Regional equality in the UK has 
become the worst of any comparable country and continues to grow.2 
It is clear from many studies over decades that  at the heart of economic 
success and greater levels of equality and fairness is effective devolution 
coupled with rooting economic activity in the local social, institutional, 
and economic fabric of places.3,4 Despite this, the UK is highly centralised 
regarding both the economic domination by a region, i.e. London and the 
South-East, and by a centralised government who stewards fiscal and 
economic policies in favour of that region.
Today the disadvantage that stems from inequality is both complex 
and varied.5 In the UK’s former industrial regions, there are still 
disproportionate levels of premature mortality,6 accompanied by lower 
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rates of employment growth and substantially higher rates of poverty.7 
In regions outside of London and the South, productivity levels are 
similar to those found in central and eastern Europe.8 England’s coastal 
peripheries include some of the poorest and least productive areas of the 
UK, their problems exacerbated by disconnection due to poor transport 
links from more economically dynamic areas.9
Efforts to address these divides have ranged from the Barlow 
Commission in 1940,10 through Beveridge, and the industrial policies 
of Labour’s Wilson government, to the introduction of enterprise zones 
in the 1980s and recent initiatives such as the Northern Powerhouse.  
However, broadly speaking, these initiatives have been unable to close 
economic divides and the longstanding disparities of economic and 
social disadvantage. 
In more recent years, attempts at decentralisation in England began 
with Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). These were set up by 
the Labour government in 1998. RDAs spent twelve years (up to their 
abolition in 2010) trying to bridge the economic output gap between 
London, the South-East and the rest of England. The work of the nine 
RDA’s was complemented by targeted area-based regeneration such 
as the Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders Programme. The RDA’s 
were a relative success and were supported by a network of regional 
government offices, EU funding and improved regional spatial planning.  
However, as is so often the case in regional policy, after a decade, the 
RDA’s were hastily abolished by the coalition government,11 and replaced 
by business-led, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs).  
The Coalition Government saw LEPs as a new non-managerialism and 
non-prescriptive approach to sub-national economic development. In 
practice, they remain stifled by centralism with a reluctance to devolve 
powers, responsibilities, or funding. Moreover, LEPs tended to be 
dominated by big business with little affinity to place.12 Accompanying 
LEPs, was a process of devolution, heralded by the then Chancellor 
George Osborne, as a ‘devolution revolution.’13 Although more accurately 
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this was mere delegation, due to the limited nature of the power and 
resources involved.14 City regions, in particular, have been focussed 
upon and identified as an integral part of devolution shaped by priorities 
around public finance deficit reduction and ambition to enable cities to 
boost economic growth and recovery.15 Despite the claims, this period 
can only be described as an ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal episode 
of decentralisation, succeeding in merely pulling devolution in a range of 
directions and muddling its precise objectives.16  
Following the introduction of LEPs, central to the government’s approach 
to devolution has been the process of ‘deal making’ whereby agreements 
on decentralised powers, responsibilities and resources have been 
negotiated between national and local city region actors. As such, we 
have at times seen tortuous and fraught deals emerge, whereby local 
city regions - after much ‘negotiation’ with Whitehall and the Treasury- 
end up signing an agreement, with only some decentralisation of power 
and resources from Whitehall departments and different combinations 
of powers allocated to different areas (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1. 
Different combinations of powers allocated to 
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What it will really take to level up
A charitable reading of this picture could interpret this outcome as 
rightly reflecting geographical differences in ambition, aspiration 
and capacity for decentralised governance. However, a more critical 
perspective recognises that what has emerged is a profoundly unjust 
and unequal manifestation of devolved power and resource.17 What we 
see here in devolution is not a significant levelling up via the breaking 
up of central power in order to forge new economic futures, but rather 
the power to only act within the confines of what Whitehall allows, and 
only in certain geographical areas. Namely, what has been devolved is 
not the full powers to deliver prosperity, but the responsibility to deliver 
austerity. Whilst some levers were decentralised (as indicated in the 
table), this did not include wider fiscal powers or other social inputs to 
economic success such as welfare. Meanwhile, all of this sits within 
retained austerity and a dominant market-liberal economic model, with 
financial investment indelibly skewed to existing winners.
The agglomeration economic model
Agglomeration is the process by which economic success is seen as 
accruing through concentrated networks of policymakers, companies, 
consumers and workers. Therefore, the focus is on the larger cities, 
as this is where there is a greater likelihood of smaller supply chains, 
cost reductions, and productivity increases take place.  However, this 
economic model has paid too little heed as to the quality of these 
alleged benefits and how corresponding wealth and opportunity are to 
be distributed. With a narrow focus on economic growth, agglomeration 
approaches tend to champion high growth sectors such as digital 
and knowledge-intensive business services as well as asset-based 
appreciation stemming from property development. Nevertheless, the 
benefits have not filtered into any significant reduction in inequality or 
addressing social or environmental injustices. Despite such failings, 
these are then presented as the economic model to which other places 
should aspire.18 
At the core of this agglomeration, economics is a desire for speedy return 
on capital investment.  This means there is a preference for the relatively 
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safe property and land markets (often in our urban centres of our core 
cities). This skews investment away from the relatively employment 
rich real economy of manufactured goods and services and the less 
investment-ready locations. The investment sector – when it does look 
to the real economy – prefers those businesses in the North or South 
with collateral, which can be pledged against the investment. This 
means property and developers. It does not mean small manufacturers 
or businesses whose pledge is the knowledge and ideas within their 
own heads.
More impoverished places or those more distanced from economic 
growth are seen as benefiting either through trickle down in wealth 
through jobs or a ‘trickle outwards’ of wealth toward any outlying (and 
poorer) areas of cities and neighbouring towns. In practice, there is no 
substantive trickle down or trickle outwards of wealth and opportunity. 
Instead, the rise of ‘residential capitalism’19 and ‘rentier capitalism’20 
where economic growth stems from appreciating asset values, has left 
all but a few speculative winners better off. There is, for example, little 
evidence that the faster-growing cities in the North, such as Manchester 
contribute to the growth of surrounding places.21 As such, the regional 
hinterlands and areas outside of these city centres are more and more 
left behind, with towns such as Bolton, Wigan and Rochdale continuing 
to struggle despite the economic success of Manchester City Centre 
and growth hotspots.22 What is more, given their greater social needs 
and higher associated cost of service provision, local authorities in 
these left-behind places have borne the brunt of austerity since 2010, 
widening social and spatial inequalities.23
Furthermore, investors are now increasingly global, often with little or 
no attachment, connection or affinity to local places. This means that 
local investors do not readily recirculate the return on investments into 
our local economies. Indeed, in an era of opaque and fast-moving global 
capital, it is increasingly difficult even to identify who investors are or 
avoid any offshoring of capital return. In this context, there are limits 
to any traditional central government ‘after the fact’ redistribution. By 
the time any wealth capture process is in place, the wealth has already 
been extracted – into the ether of the global economy.
What it will really take to level up
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What it takes to really level up?
The problem of regional economic inequality has bedevilled England 
for decades. Years of incremental ideas and piecemeal approaches 
have failed. We, therefore, need a progressive leap, which rejects the 
flawed devolution of the now and genuinely transfers power to people, 
Despite these failings, the benefits of an agglomeration approach 
continue to be rehashed as part of the continuing solution to the 
English devolution problem.  The new Prime Minister has pledged to ‘do 
devolution properly’ with “‘levelling up’ across every nation and region 
across the UK, providing support to towns and cities and closing the 
opportunity gap in our society”.24  The pledge included more funding 
support for towns and a proposal for a Northern Powerhouse ‘growth 
body’25 to stimulate growth across the North of England.26 
The term ‘Northern Powerhouse’ emerged as a policy agenda led by 
George Osbourne, whilst Chancellor of the Exchequer, encapsulating 
the idea that if the northern English cities were joined into a single 
economic bloc, they would have the power to counterbalance London.27 
As it stands, the “Powerhouse” dream being touted as the savour 
epitomises the precise failings detailed above. Powerhouses are in 
essence no more than a branding exercise that seeks to marketise a 
particular geographical area, encouraging investment in residential 
and commercial real estate and associated infrastructure.28 Whilst 
more funding support for towns may help, its association with an 
agglomeration approach will mean that the failings exposed above will 
continue to dominate.
Economic policies, which truly recognise the problems of economic 
centralism and investment, and will focus on rebuilding manufacturing, 
in the north, west, east or the south would create a beefy national 
industrial strategy, a national strategic plan, and dedicated regional 
investment vehicles.  No such things are in place. As a result, many 
areas across the land remain investment-ready but are underinvested in.
What it will really take to level up
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Establish a new national redistribution process. We need a clean 
start in which we create a national process of redistribution to deal with 
longstanding regional economic imbalances, and ensure a more level 
platform for all areas, in perpetuity. This should include a local needs 
assessment with a recognition that poorer areas need more resources.  
Others have made some calls as part of ‘levelling up’ for a national UK 
renewal fund,29 or greater retention of local business rates.  However, we 
argue that forms of renewal and regeneration funds have been tried in 
the past and have failed to deliver the transformation that is needed (for 
example, the national strategy for neighbourhood renewal, and the RDA 
‘single pot’). Furthermore, local or city regional retention of business rates 
on its own would merely deepen inequality. 
Create new fiscal powers for local areas. New local tax powers should 
1. The ask from the national government:
Hold a national constitutional convention. Devolution has been 
weak and created confusion. It has failed to tackle the fundamental 
imbalances of power and wealth. To resolve this imperfect mess, we 
need a national constitutional convention, involving devolved nations, 
local government, metro mayors, Parliament, the business community, 
Trade Unions and civil society organisations. This whole conversation 
should form the basis to new legislation, to be taken forward by 
Parliament. This conversation should consider: 
• how to develop an enduring package for constitutional reform;
• the likelihood of a federal UK and England;
• reshaping local government so that it sits alongside the central 
government as a co-director of the nation.
communities and local democratic bodies. This needs to be done within 
a deeper national system of fairness and with a proportionate response 
to the climate emergency. In this, there are both directives to national 
policy makers as well as a set of recommendation to Metro Mayors and 
local policymakers in terms of what they can and should be doing here 
and now to mitigate against the current devolution agenda’s failure to 
tackle social, economic and environmental justice.
What it will really take to level up
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1. Local action – a progressive agenda for English metro mayors:
Adopt community wealth building across the whole city region. 
Whilst economic and industrial strategy has focused on tech and 
high-productivity trading sectors, middle and low paid workers in low-
productivity, non-traded sectors have been neglected.30 We have ignored 
the important role that everyday economic sectors (such as retail, 
care, transport and utilities) play.  Place-based approaches, such as 
community wealth building31 should therefore be utilised to empower 
local areas and communities to maximise their existing skills, talents 
and capabilities. 
Community wealth building has emerged as a powerful tool to 
democratise our local economies and create wealth for all. It rejects 
the traditional economic development pathway and offers an approach 
where, the economy and wealth are brought closer to our everyday lives, 
our communities and our neighbourhoods. This will require a much 
greater emphasis on the foundational economy as the entry point for 
a revitalisation of our local economies, particularly in sectors such as 
retail food supply, retail banking and telecommunications. These sectors 
of the economy ought to be the terrain through which our next political 
economic epoch is forged, receiving a much more prominent position 
be agreed, but only once an appropriate national redistribution method 
is established (as above). These new powers should be used to create 
more secure links between people and local government by increasing 
local tax intake. Business rates reform, a local land value tax, hotel or 
tourist tax should also be considered.
Further social devolution. Human and social capital is the basis of 
a new productive and inclusive society. Therefore, English devolution 
must shift its limited focus on infrastructure, skills and economic 
development towards social powers and resources. Local areas should 
also gain more control and power over national sources of social 
investment, including welfare, education, funding for the social sector, 
cultural policy and arts funding. This should be facilitated by pooled 
pots of place-based funding for local government, covering the main 
elements of public resources within any given locality.
What it will really take to level up
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1. Establishing a community Wealth Hubs - These community 
wealth hubs would be a fundamental refocusing of business 
support, to ensure there is a plurality of vibrant, commercially viable, 
locally based, generative businesses (SMEs, co-operatives, mutuals, 
publicly owned enterprises and social enterprises) able to supply 
local needs for foundational economy goods and services. 
2. City region companies.  These would support the formation of 
municipal led and owned delivery models, in key employment 
sectors where large, extractive industries currently dominate and 
where there will continue to be high levels of need/demand post-
Covid-19. For example, the housing construction market.
3. A city region bank – to provide an alternative to traditional models 
of financial exchange and support alternative models of ownership;
4. Local state holding companies.  With the economic fallout from 
the pandemic, we face a massive prospective ownership transition, 
on the back of a wave of business closures for small and medium-
size enterprises (SMEs). To counter this threat, we should consider 
the creation of holding companies to acquire and hold distressed 
business assets during the crisis until they can be relaunched. 
5. Address climate emergency through a local green new deal.32  
In previous eras, we have been encouraged to understand 
‘the economy’ and ‘the environment’ as separate physical and 
conceptual entities, but we are now in an era where the deep 
symbiosis between the two must be treated as indubitable. The 
‘economic’ must be recoupled to the ‘environmental’. In particular, 
this calls for a national Green New Deal to have a local element 
and for local authorities/combined authorities to commit to a 
local Green New Deal plan. This should embrace the principles of 
within industrial and economic strategies. By harnessing the virtuous 
intent of local policymakers to embrace more democratic control and 
new forms of ownership, the power of the foundational economy could 
be genuinely unleashed, thereby creating a plethora of inclusive local 
economies for all. To advance a community wealth building approach, 
What it will really take to level up
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community wealth building, as described above, to engage local 
citizens in a piece by piece attack on extractive fossil capitalism.
6. Establish citizens assemblies. Workable solutions for left-behind 
places will require a bottom-up approach, where a range of political 
and civic actors come together to enforce and promote identity, 
respect and resilience within local communities. A deepening of 
democracy will therefore be fundamental in turning back the market 
liberal tide.  But whilst civil society, social action and democracy 
are the basis to a productive, inclusive economy and society, a 
substantive democratic process means going beyond the mere 
expression of preferences at the ballot box. As such, we should 
enact more deliberative mechanisms that allow all citizens to 
participate and have a real impact on the decisions that affect their 
daily reality. We must therefore accelerate existing experiments in 
deliberative democracy within combined authorities. This should 
include citizens’ assemblies and participatory budgeting.
Conclusion
We need genuine steps to devolve power, which would have a 
demonstrable impact on real economic and social lives of communities. 
We need an economy which truly works in the interests of many 
working class, lower incomes and marginalised groups.  The above 
suit of recommendations offers that by focussing on a deep reform 
and reset approach. In doing so, it rejects the rhetoric of levelling up 
from Westminster. Levelling up needs to get real – but so does our 
response to it. A decade of austerity and flawed devolution– despite 
the commendable efforts of committed politicians and council officers 
– show us this is a losing game. In this crisis, we need to demonstrate 
boldness and belligerence across the local government family – a 
willingness to hold the government’s feet to the fire, and ensure their 
rhetoric matches the reality. Our communities and localities deserve no 
less.
By Tom Lloyd-Goodwin, the Associate Director (policy) and Neil McInroy 
is the Chief Executive of Centre for Local Economic Strategies (CLES) – 
the national organisation for Local Economies
If ‘levelling up’ means 
anything, it must answer 
the crisis facing workers 
today
If it is true that there are decades when nothing happens, but also 
weeks where decades happen, for how long has Boris Johnson been 
Prime Minister? In this long year of 2020, it was in distant February 
that Johnson first announced the imminent ‘levelling up’ of Britain and 
only June when this was eclipsed by the promise of a New Deal for 
Britain. As with all of Johnson’s slogans, the promise is one of great 
anticipation. The sunny uplands to which we are to be led are always 
just over the next horizon. Such words are of little comfort now, in the 
cold reality of November, to workers in Bridgend, South Wales, where 
Ford’s Engine Plant has closed after forty years. What help is this New 
Deal to the small Lancashire town of Barnoldswick today, where workers 
are fighting to save their site as Rolls Royce plans to relocate the world-
leading fan blade manufacturing to Singapore?
Chapter 2
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The Prime Minister may talk of ‘jobs, jobs, jobs,’ however, jobs like those 
at Ford Bridgend or Rolls Royce Barnoldswick – skilled, unionised 
work with hard-won terms and conditions – may no longer be the 
norm in large parts of South Wales or Lancashire. Take the example 
of Barnoldswick, home to 11,000 people, those jobs at the rolls Royce 
factory directly sustained 1,000 families and up to four times as many 
families in the supply chain and supporting industries, and contributed 
£1.1bn to regional GDP.1 Examples such as Barnoldswick, show that 
these are not isolated islands of decent, unionised work, but that their 
importance comes from the broader networks they sustain. In fact, from 
Brexit to industrial strategy, the configuration of modern industries with 
the long-reaching UK and international supply chains have been the 
very thing that consecutive conservative governments have resolutely 
refused to understand. This is why a plant closure such as that of 
Honda in Swindon is so devastating. Not only does a region such as the 
South West lose 3,500 jobs, but as Unite’s analysis revealed, the ripple 
effect across supply chains reverberates out of Swindon to Boston, 
Milford Haven, Bristol, South Wales and into the North East.2 Industrially 
speaking, our regions do not exist in glorious isolation, but in mutual 
co-dependency. Any ‘levelling up’ agenda must start with defending 
and supporting those jobs, and utilising them as an anchoring point for 
raising the quality of work and prosperity for communities across all 
regions of our country. 
 
Turning our attention to another similar phrase, ‘left behind’ towns, 
which has also done the rounds on panel shows, policy roundtables 
and broadsheet columns for several years. Just like ‘levelling up’ it 
contains a significant mistake. Both catch-phrases make the simplistic 
yet misleading assumption that regions such as the North East, 
South Wales or the Midlands have been left behind by the uniformly 
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prosperous London and South East. This is the notion that the march 
of industrial and social progress leads to The City and that the capital 
sets the level to which all others should be upped. Yes, the economic 
gap between UK regions is the starkest of any comparable industrially 
developed nation.3  For instance, education attainment may be 
statistically higher in West London than in Sunderland, and people 
may live longer on average in Surrey than Merthyr Tydfil. But, to leave 
our understanding there, ignores the most critical point of all – the 
convenient blind spot of the Tories – inequality. London is not an 
exemplar of prosperity but of inequality. In London, 50 per cent of wealth 
is owned by the top 10 per cent, meanwhile 1.3 million working men and 
women are stuck in ‘in-work poverty.’4 Take the level of life expectancy, 
and the difference is stark between the man in Glasgow (73) and his 
peer in the leafy Chilterns (83), and yet, the difference diminishes with his 
fellow worker in my borough of Lewisham (76), while the numbers for 
Tower Hamlets and Sunderland stands jointly at 77.5
The point is that if a plan to ‘level up’ ignores the class divide within 
regions, it thereby, ignores the general economic and social crisis facing 
working people across this country, working class communities in 
London. To ignore the common problem ignores the common solution: 
a coordinated strategy between the regions. Prosperity cannot be a sum 
total game. Also, we must talk about inequality beyond just income and 
life chances to include the lack of voice and self-determination of the 
working class. There is a reason that for all of Johnson’s slogans it was 
‘Take Back Control’ which resonated in Essex as it did in Ebbw Vale.
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Manufacturing Matters and the precedent set by 
Covid
Since Theresa May brought the phrase ‘industrial strategy’ out of cold 
storage in 2017, we saw the cancelling of the Swansea Bay Lagoon 
project, the hostile acquisition of GKN by Melrose, the closure of Brush 
Electrical Machines at Loughborough, Cummins at Stamford, and the 
announced closures of Honda in Swindon and Tata’s Orb operations -– 
the UK’s only electrical steel manufacturer. The government’s record on 
manufacturing has read like a charge sheet. 
Even though this current crisis has set an important precedent for large-
scale action, hostility to state intervention is still deeply ingrained into 
the Tories. The changing electoral landscape and the sheer economic 
devastation of the Covid-19 crisis has meant the government was 
dragged into introducing the Job Retention Scheme. Now, following 
significant pressure from industry and the trade union movement, the 
government have been compelled to retain a version of it in the Job 
Support Scheme. While there are many gaps and issues to address 
in the scheme, its existence is a significant victory following many 
months of work as a movement. The state has had to intervene in the 
economy in a way unseen in a generation. The Tories have had to admit 
through their policy choices that their ‘market knows best’ orthodoxy 
simply could not withstand the realities of the crisis facing their system. 
It not only sets an important precedent; it means our expectations of 
government is now rising. In a survey of frontline Unite reps at the height 
of the first lockdown in May, 85 per cent said that ‘we cannot return to 
the way things were’ and that ‘this crisis presents an opportunity to do 
things better.’6
In June 2020, Unite launched the Manufacturing Matters strategy, a 
programme to recover and rebuild our economy, developed by the 
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top reps and shop stewards in Unite’s manufacturing sectors.7 In the 
following months, I have spoken at a series of online Unite conferences 
in every region and devolved country to talk directly with those frontline 
reps whose participation and leadership is vital if an industrial strategy 
is going to become a reality. The overarching conclusion from all those 
discussions is that it is impossible to separate the ‘levelling up agenda’ 
from the immediate question of national recovery post-Covid-19. Unite 
has warned of the tsunami of jobs which could be lost – and are already 
being lost – across industries from civil aviation and aerospace, to 
automotive and hospitality.8 Saving those jobs must be the starting 
point for government intervention in manufacturing. When confronting 
the recession in front of us, the gravest mistake the government could 
make is to repeat the very same mistakes of the past decade, where an 
increase in unemployment was met with damaging austerity policies 
and the creation of widespread insecure and low paid work. 
The economic challenges we now face can be traced to the fragility 
of the foundations of our economy due to the past decade of political 
choices. For instance, many more households are now closer to the 
financial edge than when we experienced the impact of the financial 
crash. Before Covid-19, we faced a crisis in the public sector following 
a decade of austerity and years of industrial uncertainty. Moreover, this 
economic crisis already shows the potential to be more severe. Any 
strategy must focus on solutions that protect and create decent jobs 
and incomes across all regions. 
Central to this must be job security. Over the last thirty years the 
expectation that a job could be for life, with the stability and opportunity 
that should offer, has been replaced with the precarity of agency work 
and zero hour contracts. Security of employment – the long term 
commitment and investment for the worker as well as the community 
– offers a stable basis for families and communities, strengthening the 
resilience of the foundations of our economy.
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However, the government has some catching up to do. Even at the 
height of the lockdown, when millions of workers were furloughed, 
the economy was never truly paused. Several major employers used 
their time to plan how the costs of the crisis could be handed down to 
workers under the guise of Covid-19. For instance, in July, I joined a 
socially distanced demonstration organised by Unite reps at the Nissan 
car plant in Sunderland. This was the first rally of its kind to be held 
at the plant since it opened in 1984, called because the company had 
chosen this moment, the height of a global pandemic, to attack the 
workers’ pension scheme. The closure of the scheme - which in reality is 
an opportunistic attack on workers’ deferred pay - would have left up to 
2,000 of the plant’s longest serving  loyal staff losing tens of thousands 
of pounds. Just like the ‘hire and re-fire’ tactics at British Airways and 
civil aviation and the threatened outsourcing of work by companies like 
Rolls Royce and Alexander Dennis we see a coordinated strategy of 
opportunism which any plan for reconstruction must confront.  
Our Programme to Rebuild and Recover
This then is the context in which we outline our ‘levelling up’ proposals: 
in the teeth of a sharp recession, a Tory government which has been 
dragged towards intervention, major employers preparing for an 
offensive, and a now rising expectation from working people that action 
can be taken. In our union’s strategy, we have proposed a ten-point 
programme which includes:9
1. Investment
From R&D to infrastructure and, in times of crisis, even wage subsidiary, 
we start with the principle that the state has a responsibility to intervene 
strategically and transform our economy.
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2. The defence of foundation industries
Public ownership of industries such as steel, transport, communications 
and energy which form the foundations of an industrial strategy. 
Protection for UK manufacturers from below cost dumping of products 
in international markets, with appropriate trade remedies.
3. Reform of public procurement
A ‘Build Local, Buy UK’ strategy can ensure that the UK’s public sector 
procurement budget is used to support communities. New legislation 
must compel public bodies to prioritise ‘social benefit and value/
economic impact’ not simply lowest price when awarding contracts, 
maximising UK content in procured goods and services.
4. A proactive strategy for reshoring jobs 
Remove the barriers to reshoring manufacturing jobs, including access 
to affordable energy, skills and finance. Provide financial support, both 
centrally and regionally, to investment projects while providing access to 
credit and equity for SMEs and the wider manufacturing supply chain to 
invest in the UK.
5. A just transition of industries to sustainable work
Workers must be leaders in transforming our industries, from energy 
intensive steel and glass production, to the future of the Oil and Gas 
industry and the electrification of automotive and aerospace.
6. Apprenticeships
Guarantee and expand high quality apprenticeships, with a guarantee 
of work, as genuine alternatives to solely academic qualifications and 
ensure a diversity of learners. Encourage large manufacturers to support 
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highly skilled apprentices who can be released or seconded throughout 
the wider supply chain.
7. Continuous Education
Workers must have the opportunity to up-skill and re-skill as our jobs 
and technologies develop. Large manufacturers can partner with 
local education institutes and support their supply chains to allow the 
development of skills during downtimes, with new wage protected short 
time working provisions supporting on-going learning during market 
downturns. 
8. Automation
Artificial Intelligence and other technological advances will only benefit 
the whole of society if linked to strong protections and advances for 
workers. This includes job security, shorter working time, job sharing 
without loss of pay, opportunities for reskilling and democratic oversight 
over information gathered about us. 
9. Give Every Worker A Say
Sectoral collective bargaining and new models of ownership, alongside 
strong, collective bargaining providing real collective influence over the 
decisions shaping the future of advanced, sustainable manufacturing. 
10. Changing the Rules of the Game
We have to end the reign of the asset strippers! Abolish quarterly 
reporting, introduce collective share ownership and industrial 
democracy, reign in excessive executive pay. Give workers the ability to 
oversee and intervene in strategic decision making, investments and 
takeovers of their businesses.
W
or
ke
rs
 in
 c
ris
is
   
41
What it will really take to level up
Overall, the solution to all these problems is to put well paid, secure, 
highly skilled and unionised manufacturing jobs at the heart of our 
economy and to confront the climate emergency by putting workers and 
our communities’ centre stage in a just transition to a greener, cleaner 
world. To achieve this, our strategy cannot be limited to defensive 
actions or to short-term plans for the year ahead or even to fight for 
the next round of investment as important as that is. Our collective aim 
must be to proactively shape and transition the world of work to protect 
and advance the interests of our members, families and communities 
for the next five, 10 and 30 years.
The big questions about any strategy to recover and rebuild are who 
directs it and in whose interest is it directed? A vision of Dominic 
Cummings sprinkling funding based on patronage from a Nasa-style 
‘mission control’ centre10 in Downing Street - a few million pounds 
to unblock the Manchester rail bottleneck here, a few million for 
Humberside roads there – lacks any credibility or vision.
We hold true to the belief that no one knows their industries better than 
those who do the work, and no one knows their communities better 
than those who live there. Our proposal is that workers must have a 
collective say over the decisions shaping their future in an advanced 
and sustainable economy. This can take several complimentary forms. 
At present collective bargaining gives workers a powerful collective 
voice in the workplace. This can be strengthened further though sector 
level bargaining where precarity is rife, such as hospitality, and also 
through new forms of ownership and company governance. For the 
purpose of an economy-wide strategy, Unite is calling for workers’ voice 
to be institutionalised into a national and regional strategy by giving 
permanence to the temporary. If trade unions, as the collective voice 
of workers, can be listened to in a crisis, we must be heard too in its 
recovery. 
W
or
ke
rs
 in
 c
rs
is
   
42
Conclusion
What it will really take to level up
I have called for this recovery to be coordinated by a National Recovery 
Council, alongside a series of Regional Development Councils. The 
UK has a chequered history of half-hearted attempts at this, most 
recently the ‘sector deals’ which we were promised by Theresa May’s 
government. A National Recovery Council could echo the National 
Economic Development Council abolished by the Conservative 
government in 1992, while the current Automotive Council shows the 
benefit of such an approach at the sectoral level. Provided trade unions 
can participate meaningfully, nationally and at local level, the result 
would be to bring the experience and expertise of the trade unions from 
the shop floor into the highest levels of decision making to influence the 
long-term rebuilding of our economy.
Take Wales for example. Industrially speaking Wales has been hit by 
multiple blows. Not only is it forecast to be the worst exposed part of 
the UK to the economic fallout of Covid-19, due to the higher proportion 
of workers in industries hit by the lockdown compared to the rest of 
the UK, but also, Wales has been hit by the Covid-19-related economic 
crisis, particularly in aerospace and automotive.11 In addition, multiple 
government failures to support foundation industries such as steel and 
infrastructure projects such as the Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon project, 
generating green energy and world-beating technologies, has held back 
the regional economy. The importance of the aerospace sector to Wales 
and its interconnected industries of aviation and defence is undeniable, 
with thousands of people employed across the industry. It has an annual 
turnover of £6 billion, with nine out of the ten of the sector’s largest 
companies in the world based in Wales.12
Within aerospace, there are several identifiable clusters in Wales: Airbus 
Wing Manufacture, Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO), Interiors 
and Defence. The MRO cluster, mainly situated in South Wales, employs 
approximately 6,000 people and includes British Airways Maintenance 
Cardiff, Avionics, as well as GE in Nantgarw. BAE Systems, General 
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Dynamic and Airbus Defence at Newport are also key players within the 
defence sector. 
Such clusters and networks of supply are the modern arteries of 
industry, and just as they were impacted by Covid-19, so too they can 
be used to drive prosperity. With strategic support, such as funding 
for R&D, positive procurement strategies, access to skills and support 
for the further reshoring of supply chains, such clusters can drive a 
broader regional recovery. Supporting industrial specialisation, such 
as aerospace, is a proven strategy. Regions which are supported to 
specialise in key technologies with spill-over effects of R&D and supply 
in their surrounding areas will grow more rapidly through cluster 
formation than funding distributed arbitrarily for one-off investments.
This doesn’t just apply to aerospace, automotive or steel, of course. 
Britain’s shipyards are another example - an open goal for any 
government. The campaign to defend our shipyards, led by Unite, the 
GMB and the CSEU,13 has focused on the government contracts for the 
Royal Navy’s Future Solid Support Ships (FSS), which are to be built to 
support the new generation of aircraft carriers. These contracts offer 
a lifeline to 40,000 workers, from the shipyards of Appledore in Devon 
and Cammell Laird on the Mersey to Belfast’s Harland and Wolff and 
Scotland’s Rosyth through to their extended supply chains and the blast 
furnaces of Britain’s steel and metals industries. 
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Conclusion
Time will tell if the lessons of this crisis will be learnt and applied to the 
‘levelling up agenda,’ or if it will be another slogan which will come to rest 
alongside George Osborne’s ‘March of the Makers;’ which itself lies in the 
shadow of the hunkering wreckage of the ‘Northern Powerhouse.’
In the trade union movement, there will never be any love lost for Boris 
Johnson. We are not fooled into thinking that if left to their own devices, 
he and his party’s conversion to the economic intervention will be long-
lived. Nor will it address the question of inequality. If you think otherwise, 
well I have a Garden Bridge to sell you. 
It is possible – perhaps even likely – that as the UK emerges from the 
government’s disastrous mishandling of the pandemic that the Tory’s 
old instincts will return. Maybe when talk of ‘moon shots’ has receded 
they will turn once again to ‘economists’ such as Patrick Minford 
who has seen in Brexit an opportunity to ‘run down’ automotive and 
advanced manufacturing ‘in the same way we ran down the coal and 
steel industries.’14 They might want to return to that, but we don’t have to 
let them and nor will voters who, at Johnson’s admission, had only ‘lent’ 
their votes to his government. 
I am proud of our great army of shop stewards and activists who have 
been put to the test in a way that none of us could have foreseen. 
Suppose that skill, experience and dedication can be brought to the table. 
In that case, it can lead our recovery and finally address the deep issues 
of inequality and division, across all regions and devolved countries, 
which have brought us to this point.
If the government is unable or unwilling to do it, we will do it ourselves. 
Steve Turner is Assistant General Secretary, Unite the Union
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“
”
          There are large 
and persistent 
differences in wage 
levels between regions 
and sub-regions 
of the UK
The regional pay gap
Wages are the main component of gross income, comprising just 
under half of total national income (ONS, 2020a). For most working 
age families, wage income is their main source of income. Working 
age employment at the end of 2019, was around 76 per cent of adults 
aged 16 to 64 (ONS 2020b), and around 85 per cent of people in work 
are employees, rather than self-employed. The Covid-19 pandemic 
has resulted in a fall in pay, with an estimated 2 million now earning 
less than minimum wage.1 This may be seen as a short-term Covid-19 
induced reduction, but it is key this trend is reversed fully. Any serious 
‘levelling up’ agenda must include a focus on increasing earnings 
for employees in lower-paid regions. Across the UK as a whole, the 
overall rate of wage growth since 2010 has been very low by historical 
standards, with average weekly earnings (as measured by the ONS’s 
average weekly earnings index) growing by only around 0.3% per year 
between 2010 and 2020. This is compared to growth of 1.4% per year 
between 2000 and 2010, and 1.8% per year between 1990 and 2000. 
Figure 1 shows that average real wages in the UK fell between 2008 and 
2014 before increasing after 2014, although they still have not regained 
their 2007-08 peak in real terms. 
Chapter 3
Howard Reed
Introduction
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Figure 1: Source: ONS (2020c,2020d,2016). 
Note: Real average weekly earnings calculated by dividing nominal weekly earnings by Consumer 
Prices Index. Data for 2020 based on January-March only.
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Note: Real average weekly earnings calculated by dividing nominal 
weekly earnings by Consumer Prices Index. Data for 2020 based on 
January-March only. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. analyses data on average wages 
from 21 regions across the UK based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
to show the distribution of hourly and weekly earnings in 2019. Section 
3 assesses the gap between wages in the highest-paid and lowest-paid 
regions of the UK at different points in the hourly wage distribution – the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. Section 4 shows the rate 
of growth in wages between 2010 and 2019 in different regions and 
assesses whether regions with relatively low wages in 2010 caught up 
at all with the average wage by 2019, or whether there was increased 
divergence of wages between wages over this period. Section 5 analyses 
the determinants of wages using a regression framework. How much of 
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42%
the variation in wages across regions can be explained by differences in 
worker or job characteristics? Section 6 offers conclusions.
Average weekly and hourly earnings across regions 
of the UK in 2019:
The analysis in this paper uses data from the UK Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), a detailed survey of wages for around 35,000 workers per year. 
Most of the analysis uses LFS data for 2019, before the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The Labour Force Survey divides employees in the 
UK into one of 21 regions (17 in England, 2 in Scotland, plus Wales and 
Northern Ireland which are treated as single regions) according to the 
location of their workplace. In this analysis, I classify these regions into 
four groups based on geographical location, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. 
Source: Analysis by Howard Reed, Lansman Economics, of Labour Force Survey data
Regional groupings in Labour Force Survey
Grouping
England: Northern
England: Midlands and South West
England: Greater South East
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
Regions in Grouping
Tyne & Wear
Rest of Northeast
South Yorkshire
West Yorkshire
Rest of Yorkshire & Humber
Greater Manchester
Merseyside
Rest of Northwest
East Midlands
West Midlands metropolitan area
Rest of West Midlands
South West
Central London
Inner London
Outer London
Rest of South East
East Anglia
Strathclyde
Rest of Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
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Looking first at weekly wages, in 2019 the average (mean) weekly wage 
in the Labour Force Survey for full-time workers across all regions of 
the UK was £634 per week (to the nearest pound). Figure 1 shows 
average weekly wages across each region in the UK, shown relative to 
the all-UK average. The average weekly wage for each region is shown 
as a label against each bar of the chart (for example, £551 for Tyne and 
Wear). The length and direction of the bar shows how far below average 
UK weekly wages (for left-facing bars), or how far above the average 
(for right-facing bars) each region’s weekly average earnings figure is. 
Hence, for Tyne & Wear, the bar goes left because average wages in 
Tyne and Wear are below the UK average, whereas for Central London, 
the bar goes right because wages in Central London are above the UK 
average. The regions are colour coded according to the four groups 
shown in Table 1, as follows: 
Figure 2 shows that average regional wages are only above the UK-wide 
average for 4 out of 21 regions, which includes, central London, inner 
London, outer London and the rest of the South-East. All four of these 
regions are in the Greater South-East (GSE). The only region in the GSE 
with lower-than-average weekly wages is East Anglia. Looking at the 
other broad groupings, the northern regions all have average wages 
between £550 and £600 per week except for Greater Manchester, 
where average wages are £613 per week. Average wages in Merseyside 
are the next highest at £593 per week. Tyne & Wear and the ‘Rest of 
the North’ region have the lowest average wages in this grouping, and 
indeed the lowest in England overall. In the Midlands and South-West 
grouping, wages are somewhat higher (on average) than in the North 
grouping. The four regions represented here all have average wages of 
between £570 and £600 per week, with the West Midlands metropolitan 
region having the highest wages. 
In the Greater South-East grouping, Central London (£983) has 
exceptionally high average wages compared to any other region. Wages 
in Inner London are also relatively high at £829. Outer London (£700) 
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and Inner London (£667) have average wages that are much closer to 
the UK-wide average, although still above. Weekly wages in East Anglia 
(£607) are very similar to the levels in Greater Manchester and the West 
Midlands metropolitan area. 
In the other countries of the UK, average wages in Strathclyde (£608) 
and the rest of Scotland (£628) are higher than in Wales (£561) and 
Northern Ireland (£535), which has the lowest average weekly wages 
for full-time workers of any of the 21 UK regions featured in the Labour 
Force Survey.
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Rest of Scotland
N Ireland
Figure 2. 
Source: Analysis by Howard Reed, Lansman Economics, of Labour Force Survey data
Average (mean) weekly wages for full-time 
employees in each LFS region and difference 
from UK-wide mean, 2019
Difference from UK average weekly earnings
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Subsequent analysis in this paper uses median hourly earnings for all 
employees rather than mean average earnings for full-time employees, 
as hourly earnings control for any differences in average hours worked 
across regions in the UK. In particular it is important to include part-
time workers (who comprise more than a quarter of the workforce) in 
the analysis. The median statistic for wages is more robust to extreme 
values at either end of the wage distribution than the mean, as it 
focuses on the “middle” employee in the pay distribution in each region. 
Figure 3 is a figure constructed similarly to Figure 2 but using median 
hourly earnings instead of mean weekly earnings. 
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Figure 3. 
Source: Analysis by Howard Reed, Lansman Economics, of Labour Force Survey data
Median hourly wages for all employees in 
each LFS region and difference from UK-
wide median, 2019
Difference from UK median hourly wage, all employees
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The results from Figure 3 show a similar pattern in the distribution of 
median hourly wages across regions to that of mean weekly wages in 
Figure 2 in most respects. The main differences are that the dispersion 
of median hourly earnings across regions is slightly lower than for 
mean weekly earnings. Namely, the spread between the lowest and 
highest-paying regions is lower when looking at the median hourly wage 
than when looking at the mean hourly wage. Also, the Scottish regions 
have median hourly wages that are slightly above the UK-wide median, 
whereas average weekly wages in Scotland are slightly below the UK-
wide mean.
Regional wage gaps at different points across the 
wage distribution:
The median is only one point in the hourly wage distribution for each 
region – the middle point. It is also possible to examine other points of 
the wage distribution lower down or further up the distribution. Table 2 
analyses the dispersion (spread) between hourly wage levels across the 
regions at five different points in the wage distribution: 
• the 10th percentile (10 per cent – a tenth – of the way up the 
distribution); 
• the 25th percentile (25 per cent – a quarter – of the way up the 
distribution);
• the median (halfway up the distribution – the middle);
• the 75th percentile (75 per cent – three-quarters – of the way up the 
distribution);
• the 90th percentile (90 percent – nine-tenths – of the way up). 
At each of these intervals, the left-hand column shows how far below 
the corresponding point sits in the UK-wide distribution each of the 
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three lowest-wage regions. Meanwhile, the right hand column shows 
how far above that point in the UK-wide distribution each of the three 
highest-wage regions is (taking the average of the three lowest-paid 
regions and three highest paid regions, respectively). At the 10th and 
25th percentile of the hourly wage distribution, hourly earnings in the 
lowest-paid three regions are between 6 and 7% below the UK-wide 
10th and 25th percentiles respectively. At the median the lowest-paid 
regions are paid around 12 percent below the UK-wide average, and the 
gap between the lowest paid and the UK-wide statistic increases to 16% 
at the 75th percentile and 21% at the 90th percentile. 
The gap between the three highest-paid regions and the UK average is 
also bigger at the median and 75th percentile (around 34 to 35 percent) 
than it is at the 25th percentile (28 per cent) or the 10th percentile (20 
percent), although at the 90th percentile the gap is slightly lower (30%). 
Overall, Table 2 shows that the spread between the lowest and highest 
paid regions increases the further up the wage distribution we go, at 
least as far up as the 75th percentile (three-quarters of the way up the 
distribution).
Table 2. 
Source: Analysis by Howard Reed, Lansman Economics, of Labour Force Survey data
Distribution of hourly wages in lowest-paid and highest-paid regions 
compared to whole UK at different points of the distribution
Distributional point (percentile)
10th
25th
50th (median)
75th
90th
Lowest-paid three regions,
averaged                                
-6.0%
-6.7%
-11.8%
-16.0%
-20.9%
Highest-paid three regions,
averaged                                
+20.2%
+27.9%
+34.0%
+34.9%
+30.5%
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Changes in wages across regions from 2010 to 2019:
So far, this paper has focused on the distribution of wages in 2019. 
But it is also instructive to examine how wages changed across the 
last decade and whether regional imbalances are growing, shrinking or 
largely static. Across the UK as a whole, the median real hourly wage 
across all employees (measured in 2020 prices) was £12.46 in 2010 
and £12.52 in 2019 – almost unchanged in real terms. However, this 
overall figure conceals significant changes in median wages within 
regions. For example, in Scotland (outside Strathclyde) median wages 
grew by 80 pence per hour between 2010 and 2019, while in Inner 
London median wages fell by 57 pence per hour over the same period. 
Figure 4 below is a scatterplot diagram which shows the relationship 
between the median wage in 2010 and the change in median wages 
between 2010 and 2019 for each of the 21 regions in the Labour Force 
survey data. Each region is shown as a circular point with the points 
colour-coded according to the same schema used in Figures 2 and 3. 
Scatterplot of change in real median hourly wages 
across UK regions, 2010-19
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Figure 4. 
Source: Analysis by Howard Reed, Lansman Economics, of Labour Force Survey data
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Overall, Figure 4 shows evidence of some reduction in the dispersion of 
median wages across regions between 2010 and 2019, driven mainly 
by reduced median wages in central London and Inner London, and also 
by higher-than average growth in some (though not all) of the northern 
regions, some  of the midlands, and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. A “line of best fit” (regression line) drawn across all the points 
in Figure 3 shows that on average, for each extra pound higher that 
average wages were in a region in 2010, that region’s wages increased 
by around 6 pence per hour less over the 2010s. In other words, lower-
wage regions had slightly higher growth than high wage regions over 
the decade. However, the effect is relatively small, and occurred during 
a decade in which wage growth was exceptionally low by post-war 
standards as shown in the introduction. So, it would be optimistic to 
claim that a regional “levelling up” was occurring in wages over the 
period 2010 to 2019. 
Explaining the differences in wages between regions:
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this paper have shown that there are clear and 
persistent differences in average wages between regions. It is important 
to establish to what extent these differences in wages can be explained 
by differences in the characteristics of employees in each region and/
or the profile of jobs in each region. If it turns out to be the case that 
differences in individual characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, age 
or disability status are key determinants of wages, and that there are 
variations in the distributions of those characteristics across labour 
markets in different regions, then an obvious policy lever to “level up” 
the labour market would be to reduce differences in wage levels across 
personal characteristics. For example, by taking action to reduce the 
degree of discrimination in the labour market by gender, ethnicity, age or 
disability status. 
Re
gi
on
al
 p
ay
 g
ap
   
56
What it will really take to level up
Another possibility is that there are differences in educational 
qualifications across different regions. For example, around two-thirds 
of employees in the Central London region have a university degree 
compared to an average of 35 percent of employees across the whole 
UK. This helps explain why average wages in Central London are 
much higher than the UK average (although as shown below, it is not 
a complete explanation of the gaps). A third possibility is that there are 
variations in the characteristics of jobs as well as employees in each 
region. For example, the profile of jobs by occupation or industry sector 
may be very different in each region. Around 15 per cent of employees 
in Central London work in the financial services sector compared to only 
2.5 per cent of employees in Wales, for example. 
This section uses a statistical regression framework to analyse the 
extent to which differences in wages by region are correlated with 
differences in employee and job characteristics. The specific functional 
form of the regression is a quantile regression of median hourly wages 
for employees in the LFS in 2019. The explanatory variables in the 
regression are as follows:
• the 21 LFS regions in the UK (dummy variables for each region);
• employee characteristics.
 w sex; (male/female);
 w ethnicity (Bangladeshi, Black, Chinese, Indian, Mixed, other   
 Asian, other ethnicity, Pakistani, White);
 w disabled (as defined by the Equality Act);
 w age group (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 or over);
 w highest qualification (degree, other higher education, A level or  
 equivalent, GCSE or equivalent, other, no qualifications); 
• job characteristics:
 w industry (SIC2007 categories A to S);
 w occupation (SOC2000 categories 1 to 9).
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What it will really take to level up
Figure 5 below shows the impact of controlling for differences in 
employee and job characteristics on the spread of average (median) 
hourly wages across the 21 UK regions.  The light-coloured bars 
(coloured according to the region-grouping schema used in previous 
charts in this paper) show the ‘raw’ differences in median hourly wages 
for each region compared to the UK-wide median wage. These are 
calculated using the results from a regression of hourly wages on 
regional dummy variables with no other explanatory variables included. 
The pattern shown is very similar to the median wage analysis in 
Figure 3 above. The darker coloured bars show the differences in 
median hourly wages for each region after controlling for differences in 
employee and job characteristics. In other words, they are an estimate 
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Figure 5. 
Source: Analysis by Howard Reed, Lansman Economics, of Labour Force Survey data
Median hourly wages in UK regions compared to UK 
average: the impact of controlling for differences in 
employee and job characteristics
Difference from UK-wide median (£ per hour)
Tyne & Wear
Rest of the North
South Yorks
West Yorks
Rest of Yorks & Humber
Greater Manchester
Merseyside
Rest of NW
East Midlands
West Mids Metro
Rest of W Mids
South West
Central London
Inner London
Outer London
Rest of SE
East Anglia
Wales
Strathclyde
Rest of Scotland
N Ireland
Lighter bars show raw differences. Darker bars show regression. Adjusted difference.
What it will really take to level up
An analysis of the darker ‘regression-adjusted’ bars in Figure 5 
compared to the lighter ‘raw’ bars shows that controlling for differences 
in employee and job characteristics significantly reduces the spread of 
average wages across regions – but it does not eliminate the spread 
completely. For example, the raw median hourly wage in central London 
is just under £8 higher than the UK-wide average, while the regression-
adjusted median hourly wage is just under £5 higher than the UK-
wide average. In the East Midlands region, the unadjusted median 
hourly wage is around £1.25 lower than the UK-wide median, while the 
regression-adjusted hourly wage is around 50p lower. The process of 
adjusting wages to take account of differences in employee and job 
characteristics reduces the gap between median wages in each region 
and the UK average for all regions except Greater Manchester, where 
regression adjustment makes the gap larger. 
An analysis of the standard deviation (a statistical measure of spread) 
of median wages across all 21 regions before and after regression 
adjustment shows that differences in employee and job characteristics 
across regions explain about 40% (two-fifths) of the variation in wages 
across regions. This is a substantial amount, but the analysis still leaves 
more than half of the wages gap between regions unexplained. 
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Conclusion
This paper has shown that there are large and persistent differences in 
wage levels between regions and sub-regions of the UK using a number 
of different measures of average wages and other points of the wage 
distribution. Wages are persistently above the UK average in London 
and the South East of England (and especially in Central and Inner 
London) while they are persistently below the UK average in most other 
regions (and especially the Northern English regions excluding Greater 
Manchester and Merseyside, the East Midlands, the West Midlands 
outside the West Midlands metropolitan area, Wales and Northern 
Ireland). 
What it will really take to level up
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While there was some reduction in the dispersion of average wages 
across different regions between 2010 and 2019, this only closed a 
small percentage of the wage gap between the lowest and highest-
paid regions. Furthermore, the compression of wages occurred at a 
point where wages were growing particularly slowly compared with the 
average for previous decades, so it would be optimistic to claim that a 
“levelling up” was occurring in wages over the most recent decade. The 
impact of COVID-19 on the wage distribution cannot yet be assessed 
using data that are available so far. 
This paper has shown that there are large and persistent differences in 
wage levels between regions and sub-regions of the UK using a number 
of different measures of average wages and other points of the wage 
distribution. Wages are persistently above the UK average in London 
and the South East of England (and especially in Central and Inner 
London) while they are persistently below the UK average in most other 
regions (and especially the Northern English regions excluding Greater 
Manchester and Merseyside, the East Midlands, the West Midlands 
outside the West Midlands metropolitan area, Wales and Northern 
Ireland). 
While there was some reduction in the dispersion of average wages 
across different regions between 2010 and 2019, this only closed a 
small percentage of the wage gap between the lowest and highest-
paid regions. Furthermore, the compression of wages occurred at a 
point where wages were growing particularly slowly compared with the 
average for previous decades, so it would be optimistic to claim that a 
“levelling up” was occurring in wages over the most recent decade. The 
impact of COVID-19 on the wage distribution cannot yet be assessed 
using data that are available so far. 
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Re
gi
io
na
l p
ay
 g
ap
  6
1
In terms of options for policymakers in “levelling up” the gap between 
different regions, four potential options are available. The first three of 
these relate to the regression evidence from Section 5 of this paper 
which showed that around 40 per cent of the median wage differentials 
between different regions can be accounted for by differences in 
employee and job characteristics. Personal characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity and age, educational qualifications, and industry 
sector and occupational characteristics of jobs all had a role to play 
in explaining inter-regional differences in wages. Each of these sets 
of characteristics suggests a possible strategy for reducing wage 
differentials, as follows:
1. Reducing pay discrimination in the labour market according to 
Equality Act characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, disability and 
age. 
2. Improving the profile of educational qualifications in regions 
where wages are lower than average (for example, increasing the 
proportion of employees with degrees and/or A-levels working in the 
lower-paid regions. 
3. Encouraging a more even spread of jobs in higher-paying 
occupations and industries across different regions so that high-
paying jobs are not so concentrated in London and the South East. 
The fourth policy option requires further research to ascertain what 
other factors, not observed in the LFS dataset, explain the remaining 60 
per cent of the wage gap between different regions that is not explicable 
by differences in employee and job characteristics. For example, do 
wage differentials reflect differences in the cost of living between 
London and the South East and elsewhere in the UK? Housing cost 
differentials could be important in explaining regional differences in 
wages, for instance. Three-fifths of the regional wage gap is unexplained 
by the analysis in this chapter; filling in that blank space with further 
What it will really take to level up
Re
gi
on
al
 p
ay
 g
ap
   
62
explanations would make it easier for policymakers to assess the 
correct strategy to “level up” wages to the fullest extent possible. 
By Howard Reed, Landman Economics
“
”
          Good quality public 
transport is absolutely 
crucial to any levelling up 
agenda.
Levelling Up in Public 
Transport
Good quality public transport is absolutely crucial to any ‘levelling up’ 
agenda, and unions agree it should be a universal basic right.1 From 
health and wellbeing, to employment opportunities, environmental 
factors and social and economic inequality – there are multiple 
measures which demonstrate the importance of our public transport 
networks. This is true wherever you live in Britain. Often, there is not 
so much a North-South divide with public transport provision, as a 
metro-suburban/rural divide. It is also clearly a class issue, with a strong 
correlation between social disadvantage and access to public transport. 
This paper explores these factors and updates the picture in the wake of 
Covid-19, which has decimated passenger volumes. We explain why we 
welcome High-Speed 2 (HS2) as part of a ‘levelling up’ agenda and call 
for greater investment in public transport projects across the country, 
including Northern Powerhouse Rail, Crossrail 2, investment in new 
electric bus fleets, and restoring and maintaining bus routes to create 
affordable, accountable integrated transport supporting more active 
travel such as walking and cycling, with the funding to make it work.
Chapter 4
Sian Jones
Introduction
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What it will really take to level up
Transport as a class issue
Good transport links hold the key to accessing employment and 
schools, as well as health, social and leisure services. If you can reach 
where you need to go easily, quickly and cheaply, then you have 
more options, and your quality of life is enhanced. That proximity to 
good transport links will push up the property and rental prices, so 
neighbourhoods with good transport links tend to be more affluent – as 
a recent government report found: ‘mobility and accessibility inequalities 
are highly correlated with social disadvantage.’2 Subsequently, the poorer 
you are, the less likely you are to live within easy walking distance of a 
rail, tube or metro station. 
You are also less likely to own or have access to a private vehicle, which 
significantly reduces your mobility options. This is particularly stark 
in Scotland where car usage is closely related to affluence,3 whereas 
London has the lowest car ownership in London (why own a car if 
you have good, relatively cheap and reliable public transport?). Poor 
transport particularly affects shift workers as cuts to services often 
render them inconvenient or useless, meaning that a lack of transport 
services ‘considerably exacerbates the problem [of inequality] in many 
parts of the UK.’4 
Moreover, women are less likely to have access to a car and are 
more likely to travel by bus, on foot, community transport or taxi 
than men. Consequently, poor quality, unreliable and expensive 
public transport has a far bigger impact on women’s lives. We need 
to plan and run public transport in a way which makes it positively 
accessible to everyone. This can only happen if transport policy makers 
properly consult with passenger groups, disabled peoples’ and user 
organisations as well as the transport unions. Research needs to be 
commissioned into the adequacy of safe, accessible public transport 
for disabled people and their experience of using these services. Further, 
public transport should be classed as an essential service, under public 
ownership and with robust regulations in place. As the UN said of the 
UK: ‘abandoning people to the private market in relation to a service that 
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affects every dimension of their basic wellbeing is incompatible with 
human rights requirements.’5
The neglect of the Bus service
People travel by bus in huge numbers. In the year ending March 2020 
(i.e. mostly pre-lockdown) a staggering 4.13 billion local passenger 
bus journeys were taken,6 accounting for more than half of all public 
transport use.7 Bus travel has been gradually but steadily decreasing 
in recent years since its peak in London in 2014 and 2007/8 outside of 
London. Despite this, the National Audit Office predicts that ‘bus travel 
will likely remain the primary and essential mode of transport for many, 
especially the most disadvantaged.’8 But bus services are under pressure.
The Campaign for Better Transport exposed that funding was almost 
£400 million a year lower in 2019 than it was a decade ago, with well 
over 3,000 local authority supported bus services lost or reduced.9 In 
London in 2018, 48 socially desirable bus routes were cut leaving those 
who relied on them with no equivalent public transport to replace this 
void other than walking – something which is not an option for many.
Deregulation of bus services outside of London is largely to blame 
for the cuts, with local authorities prohibited from cross-subsidising 
unprofitable routes. It has not led to much competition either, as bus 
services are run by just five major operators monopolising certain 
‘core territories’.10 London has fared differently and been able to take 
advantage of franchising models in which TfL takes on the revenue risk 
of running bus services by collecting the fares and paying operators a 
fixed fee. This has prevented so much money being drained from the 
system in shareholder dividends.11 Nevertheless, it has resulted in a 
schedule that leaves many drivers exhausted - a system that delivers 
safe, affordable public transport must recognise the needs of staff. 
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Levelling up, down, across and within
The disparity in transport provision and spending across the country 
is not as simple as a North-South divide. Urban-rural factors are 
significant, there is a concentration in high-density population areas, 
with London spending the highest per head on transport at roughly 
twice the rate of other parts of the country and more than three times 
the lowest spend region of the East Midlands.12
Commuters everywhere have miserable stories to share. Constant 
delays and cancellations, coupled with overcrowding and unreliability 
has led to personal tragedies including stress-related ill health, job 
losses, and even relationship breakdowns for passengers of ‘Southern 
Fail.’13 A similar experience was endured by passengers of Northern, 
with appalling delays and thousands of cancellations during the 
botched 2018 new timetable fiasco. When private ownership fails, the 
government steps in for these vital services under the ‘operator of last 
resort’, and Northern was renationalised in 2020.14 At the same time, 
congestion and lack of dedicated bus lanes have left passengers on our 
most-used public transport services stewing in traffic when they simply 
want to get to and from work, shops and services.
Different quality rolling stock is another area of inequality in public 
transport provision. The hated ‘pacer’ trains were decommissioned in 
much of the South after 2015 yet are still in operation on routes in the 
North of England and down in the South West. Pacers have become a 
physical emblem of rail inequality – noisy, dirty, uncomfortable to ride 
in and a world away from their new clean, quiet, and accessible electric 
cousins. The same applies to buses, where London has invested in cleaner, 
quieter electric and hybrid vehicles ahead of other parts of the country.16 
To this government’s shame, under their watch planned rail 
electrification projects outside of South East England had been 
cancelled, including the Cardiff to Swansea section of the Great Western 
Mainline, Kettering to Nottingham, Derby and Sheffield and Oxenholme 
to Windermere. Former Transport Secretary Chris Grayling claimed it 
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was because there were other ways of delivering improvements with 
less disruption. However, the National Audit Office subsequently found 
that the reasons for the cancellation had been purely financial. In other 
words, the Tory government made a political decision that despite the 
benefits it could deliver to rail infrastructure outside of the South-East, it 
was not worth government spending. Electrification is essential because 
it improves environmental quality by replacing dirty diesel engines, 
allows quicker braking and acceleration, in turn increasing capacity on 
those lines and materially improving journeys for passengers.17 
For many people living outside of London, rail travel is not an option 
at all. The legacy of Dr Beeching’s cuts from the 1960s is the loss of 
over 5,000 miles of rail lines, thousands of railway stations. Many of 
these lines provided rail access to smaller or more rural locations, 
exacerbating the lack of public transport for such areas. There have 
been some attempts to reverse this, including this year’s ‘Restoring 
Your Railway’ fund.18 Mostly focused on re-opening lines closed by 
Beeching, these projects19 would only provide piecemeal improvements 
to a small number of local services. The funding available is a drop in 
the infrastructure ocean, covering consultants rather than construction, 
meaning it is not the major investment needed to truly ‘level up.’  
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HS2 and beyond
From a discussion of the current creaking and congested public transport 
network, we move onto the projects which can radically improve services 
and simultaneously address climate change.
Major infrastructure projects have the potential to address inequalities and 
deficits in transport provision radically, and high-speed rail is right at the 
top of the ‘shovel ready’ project list. We strongly back the HS2 rail project 
which will run from London Euston to Birmingham Curzon Street, and then 
on to Crewe, Manchester and Leeds. However, we argue that it should go 
all the way to Scotland, and to start building down from the North now 
rather than waiting and be complemented with the simultaneous building 
of HS3, or Northern Powerhouse Rail (or Crossrail for the North). 
What it will really take to level up
The country’s rail network is overcrowded and badly in need of 
investment. HS2 was conceived under a Labour government and then 
approved way back in 2012.20 Mismanagement under successive Tory 
governments has led to delays and cost increases, but the value and 
necessity of the project remain. HS2 is already supporting around 9,000 
jobs and over the 20-year construction period is expected to create 
30,000 engineering and construction jobs, including 2,000 apprentices, 
and an additional 400,000 supply chain jobs.21 British Steel should be 
utilised for this project to reduce the distance the tracks need to travel 
before being installed alongside rolling stock manufactured by a UK 
based facility. Improvements in accessibility and environmental impact 
are further positives the project brings. 
The new high-speed line will take fast intercity trains off the existing lines 
across the West Coast Main Line, and in doing so free up capacity to run 
more local and regional services outside of London. Journey times will 
be reduced across a multitude of services and greater freight capacity on 
our railways will decongest our roads, cutting emissions. To benefit the 
regions, it must go through to Manchester, Leeds and Crewe.
However, it is not just HS2 that we need in order to ‘level up’ our public 
transport system. Crossrail for the North, or Northern Powerhouse Rail 
(NPR), is another crucial part of the jigsaw. The project consists of new 
and upgraded lines to provide fast West-East services from Liverpool 
across to Hull, and better connectivity through Manchester, Sheffield, 
Leeds, York and Newcastle.22 In doing so, NPR will bring up to 10 million 
people within 90 minutes of four or more northern cities and is projected 
to help generate 35,000 more jobs in northern city centres.23 Many of these 
fall within the ‘red wall’ constituencies taken by the Conservatives in the 
2019 election, presumably making this a priority project for government. 
Lastly, we want to see Crossrail 2 get the go-ahead in London as it 
will allow for extra capacity and faster journeys across our capital city, 
including regeneration across the South-East.24 
Regarding bus services, research has found that public ownership 
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of buses would save £506 million a year25 that could be invested in 
developing better bus networks and lowering fares. In addition, the 
government should use its purchasing power to support industries and 
jobs and create an upgraded, sustainable future, such as purchasing its 
promised 4,000 new, greener buses26 from British manufacturers with 
the obligation that such spend must maintain and create jobs in this 
country. The government and/or local councils could then lease these to 
bus operators in localities across the country.
HS2 and beyond
From a discussion of the current creaking and congested public 
transport network, we move onto the projects which can radically 
improve services and simultaneously address climate change.
Major infrastructure projects have the potential to address inequalities 
and deficits in transport provision radically, and high-speed rail is right 
at the top of the ‘shovel ready’ project list. We strongly back the HS2 
rail project which will run from London Euston to Birmingham Curzon 
Street, and then on to Crewe, Manchester and Leeds. However, we 
argue that it should go all the way to Scotland, and to start building 
down from the North now rather than waiting and be complemented 
with the simultaneous building of HS3, or Northern Powerhouse Rail (or 
Crossrail for the North). 
The country’s rail network is overcrowded and badly in need of 
investment. HS2 was conceived under a Labour government and then 
approved way back in 2012.20 Mismanagement under successive Tory 
governments has led to delays and cost increases, but the value and 
necessity of the project remain. HS2 is already supporting around 9,000 
jobs and over the 20-year construction period is expected to create 
30,000 engineering and construction jobs, including 2,000 apprentices, 
and an additional 400,000 supply chain jobs.21 British Steel should be 
utilised for this project to reduce the distance the tracks need to travel 
before being installed alongside rolling stock manufactured by a UK 
based facility. Improvements in accessibility and environmental impact 
are further positives the project brings. 
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The new high-speed line will take fast intercity trains off the existing 
lines across the West Coast Main Line, and in doing so free up capacity 
to run more local and regional services outside of London. Journey 
times will be reduced across a multitude of services and greater freight 
capacity on our railways will decongest our roads, cutting emissions. To 
benefit the regions, it must go through to Manchester, Leeds and Crewe.
However, it is not just HS2 that we need in order to ‘level up’ our public 
transport system. Crossrail for the North, or Northern Powerhouse Rail 
(NPR), is another crucial part of the jigsaw. The project consists of new 
and upgraded lines to provide fast West-East services from Liverpool 
across to Hull, and better connectivity through Manchester, Sheffield, 
Leeds, York and Newcastle.22 In doing so, NPR will bring up to 10 
million people within 90 minutes of four or more northern cities and is 
projected to help generate 35,000 more jobs in northern city centres.23 
Many of these fall within the ‘red wall’ constituencies taken by the 
Conservatives in the 2019 election, presumably making this a priority 
project for government. 
Lastly, we want to see Crossrail 2 get the go-ahead in London as it 
will allow for extra capacity and faster journeys across our capital city, 
including regeneration across the South-East.24 
Regarding bus services, research has found that public ownership 
of buses would save £506 million a year25 that could be invested in 
developing better bus networks and lowering fares. In addition, the 
government should use its purchasing power to support industries and 
jobs and create an upgraded, sustainable future, such as purchasing its 
promised 4,000 new, greener buses26 from British manufacturers with 
the obligation that such spend must maintain and create jobs in this 
country. The government and/or local councils could then lease these to 
bus operators in localities across the country.
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Environmental impact of levelling up on transport
The above projects are important to a ‘levelling up’ agenda not just for 
economic reasons, but because pollution and climate change
What it will really take to level up
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are also class issues. Alongside putting in place electric bus fleets, 
and recognising rail is by far the most carbon-efficient mass transit 
transport system available we have, there is the potential to make 
radical improvements on both fronts.27 It is essential to support 
integrated, accessible and sustainable transport. With investment and 
commitment to renewable electricity generation and energy-efficient 
electric rail (including decarbonising the existing network),28 new 
projects such as HS2 have the potential to make a significant impact on 
reducing the UK’s carbon emissions. 
Whether it is for commuter, leisure or freight travel, a shift in road 
traffic to rail, and investment in public transport, cleaner fuels and 
electric vehicles reduces carbon emissions, makes long journeys far 
more efficient, and lightens our over-congested roads. Crossrail for the 
North would have a significant impact on commuter experiences, and 
of course, on air quality in the region. But, only these big projects can 
deliver such big results; their importance cannot be overstated. Studies 
have found a strong link between poverty and higher exposure to air 
pollution.29 Transport is a major cause of air pollution and is the main 
source of nitrogen dioxide (NO2) emissions.30 Exposure to this and other 
air pollutants can have adverse effects on health and quality of life and 
has been shown to increase hospital admissions for stroke, respiratory 
disease and cardiac arrest, as well as stunting lung growth in children.31 
It is also closely linked to asthma, which London has the highest rate of 
in Europe, leading Mayor Sadiq Khan to declare a ‘health emergency.’32
Hence, if you are poorer, your health is likely to be affected by your 
exposure to air pollution, often from busy roads. By reducing polluting road 
traffic, shifting people to clean forms of active travel for short journeys 
and onto (preferably clean electric) public transport for other journeys, 
we can radically reduce air pollution, carbon emissions and improve our 
nation’s physical and environmental health. To achieve this, we should be 
piloting what countries like Germany are already starting to roll out: free 
public transport services.33 This is an opportunity that should be seized 
– the upgrading of rail, bus and other public transport will require the 
procurement of new stock and vehicles, all of which can be manufactured 
What it will really take to level up
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here in the UK. A positive procurement policy to do this can maintain and 
create jobs in these manufacturing industries at a crucial time.
It is impossible to write about transport – or anything – without 
acknowledging the impact the coronavirus pandemic has had. Covid-19 
has decimated passenger numbers across all forms of public transport. 
Between February and May 2020 (i.e. pre and post lockdown) railway 
services almost halved (a 47% drop) and weekly journeys went from 
22.3 million to 1.7m.34 Even after the lockdown was eased, passenger 
numbers remained low, and have started to dip again with rail use at 
32% of pre-covid levels and bus passenger volumes flatlining at 59% as 
of 5 October.35 The Office for Road and Rail described it as “the lowest 
levels last seen in the mid-nineteenth century”.36
While effort has been put into shifting people to forms of ‘active travel’ 
– walking and cycling – it is clear that private car use has risen. Car use 
picked up quickly after lockdown and had returned to normal levels by 
the beginning of August, while rail and bus use languished on 31% and 
42%, respectively, and has risen only slightly since.37 For rail use, we 
are seeing a new pattern emerge where passenger numbers are higher 
(if only slightly) on the weekends than weekdays. The death of the 
commute must be responsible. 
We have tragically seen the death of many transport workers, especially 
bus drivers and BAME workers.38 However, there is evidence that 
public transport can be a Covid-19-safe place.39 In France, only 1.2% 
of infections are related to public transport use, and it seems that 
measures such as regular cleaning, ventilation, mandatory use of 
masks and even banning talking (yes really – do not try speaking on the 
subway in Japan) can be effective ways of reducing transmission.40 Yet 
government advice regularly includes requests to avoid public transport, 
and the public does not seem convinced that public transport is safe. 
Higher car travel is an inevitable result. Our industry needs to respond to 
changes in passenger behaviour and adopt new approaches to ticketing, 
such as flexible season tickets to adapt to changing work patterns 
Covid-19 impact on public transport
What it will really take to level up
Conclusion
When it comes to ‘levelling up,’ investing in clean, accessible and efficient 
public transport networks has huge potential to transform our country 
in an inclusive and climate-friendly way. The job creation from big 
infrastructure projects will have a multiplier effect on the wider economy 
in the short term and the potential for long-lasting job creation once 
operational. Done right, the climate effects would also be significant 
through shifting millions of passenger and freight journeys off our 
congested roads and onto quick, clean and accessible electric rail and 
new fleets of electric buses.
Pu
bl
ic
 tr
an
sp
or
t  
74
within the rising culture of flexible hours contracts, women are more 
likely to be part-time and disadvantaged by the high cost of season 
tickets, more likely to need transport for caring responsibilities as well as 
paid work. Flexible ticketing would attract more people and be more for 
practical for commuters post-pandemic.
It’s clear that the government has a massive opportunity to guide 
‘levelling up’ - or down - in transport post-Covid-19. In London, the 
government has been forced to ditch highly controversial proposals 
for the TfL funding settlement which required scrapping free travel for 
under-18s, restrictions on Freedom Pass travel and rumours of fare 
rises.41 However, this is a ‘stop gap’ deal, and further funding will be 
required to see London’s public transport through the full effects of the 
pandemic which has devastated revenues.42 
Covid-19 also provides the government with an unprecedented 
opportunity to take positive action to bring rail and other public transport 
services into public ownership – as Wales announced in October.43 
During lockdown, the government took on the responsibility and cost of 
running our railways, and that situation has effectively been extended 
for up to 18 months (albeit with private shareholders still receiving over 
£100m in pay-outs). Until the Williams Rail Review is published, we do 
not know quite which way the government will turn, but they admit that 
franchising has failed.44
What it will really take to level up
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By strategically targeting areas of socio-economic deprivation for 
access to affordable (or even free) public transport, the lives of those 
communities would be measurably enhanced as their ability to access 
wider employment, leisure and service opportunities grows. Similar 
benefits would be felt by those more rural towns and villages which had 
been cut off from rail travel and poorly served - if at all – by local bus 
services. Our transport planning system penalises people who cannot 
afford a car or afford rising fares, something which hits older, disabled 
and minority groups hardest.
The country is at a turning point. The shiny shovel ready HS2 project is 
underway, but to truly meet its ‘levelling up’ promises the government 
must not leave gaping holes in regional transport infrastructure 
investment, and above all, it must not be allowed to play political games 
with funding. 
Sian Jones is Head of Communications at the TSSA Union. Additional 
contributions by Aslef and Unite the Union.
Levelling up Black, Asian 
and minority ethnic 
communities
Chapter 5
Maurice McLeod
Introduction
If the Government’s concept of a nation sharing the fruit of its labour 
more equitably is to be achieved, steps need to be taken to ‘level up’ 
black, Asian and minority ethnic communities – no matter where they 
happen to live geographically. The feelings of being left behind that 
fuelled both Brexit1 and Boris Johnson’s ascendance is felt every bit as 
strongly in marginalised communities across the country.
In order to bridge the gap between held-down and under-invested 
communities, and the asset-owning class, we will need to pay particular 
attention to the role racial inequality plays in shaping the different parts 
of society, and what specific and targeted policies are required to tackle 
the problems. Racial disparities in employment, including pay and 
progression, and access to credit are significant factors in determining 
life-chances as well as education and ‘opportunity’. We should 
underpin action on racism with a Race Equality Act, as recommended 
by Baroness Doreen Lawrence.2 This would enshrine a commitment 
to eliminating racial disparities, not merely monitoring them. We 
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should also develop narratives around race and class to popularise 
an appreciation of the common barriers holding back working-class 
people of all backgrounds; to increase understanding of the particular 
dynamics of race that impact upon people of colour. This would 
improve our understanding of our history, a consequence of which 
would break down prejudices against immigrants and refugees so that 
new-comers are treated with humanity.
Geographical inequality landscape of race and class
When looking at geographical, namely regional inequalities, we have 
to consider interregional inequalities. A failure to do so would simply 
maintain or increase local inequalities - leaving black, Asian and 
minority ethnic groups even further behind their white counterparts. 
The Runnymede Trust and Manchester University’s report, Local Ethnic 
Inequalities,3 found that between the decade of 2001 and 2011, the 
ethnic inequalities in employment and housing had grown. These are the 
two most direct wealth indicators of the four examined, the other two 
being education and health.4 Nevertheless, education is also impacted 
by wealth and is an indicator of potential future earnings. Further, 
poor health is both a symptom and a cause of inequality, whereas 
employment and housing are both much more closely correlated to 
current wealth. 
The Local Ethnic Inequalities report found that the inequalities existed 
in areas with large minority ethnic communities, like Tower Hamlets; in 
smaller minority communities; and wealthier rural areas, like Breckland in 
mid-Norfolk. This demonstrates the systemic nature of racism in Britain 
because the effects of racism are evident, to varying degrees, regardless 
of the economic environment in which black, Asian and minority ethnic 
communities find themselves living. Many of the areas which were 
reported to have become more unequal between 2001 and 2011 were 
semi-rural and rural districts that had low ethnic diversity levels and 
small ethnic minority populations at the start of the decade. 
What it will really take to level up
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Areas like Bradford bucked the trend and showed a decrease in 
ethnic inequalities in the decade between the last two censuses. The 
west Yorkshire city, with its large Asian population, saw particular 
improvements in education, with most ethnic minority groups closing 
the attainment gap that had opened up with white British students. The 
only group for whom the educational inequality got worse was the white 
‘other’ group. On a measure of multiple inequalities, Bradford moved 
from the 5th most unequal district in 2001 to the 22nd a decade later. 
However, educational attainment does not translate into proportional 
increases in employment success and income,5 especially when 
factoring out self-employment within BAME communities. 
While ethnic inequality was virtually universal, it was by no means 
uniform. The Index of Multiple Inequality (IMI) indicates that the most 
unequal districts of England and Wales were Lambeth, Haringey, 
Rotherham, Oldham, and Tower Hamlets. The most equal were 
Knowsley, Copeland, The Vale of Glamorgan, Hartlepool and North 
Warwickshire. On the other hand, in London, ‘inner-city’ boroughs are 
increasingly defined by gentrification, which sees ever-greater disparities 
between wealthy and poverty-stricken residents living in close proximity 
but entirely different lives. Meanwhile, employment inequality grew in 
over a third of districts with black, mixed and Asian groups doing worst 
when compared to white Britons. Housing inequality also grew across 
most districts, with black groups living in the lowest quality housing. 
People from minority ethnic backgrounds suffered from higher levels of 
overcrowding than their white British peers in every district in England 
and Wales in 2011.
Despite the Government’s claims to have reduced the ethnic 
employment gap, there is nothing to suggest that inequalities 
have reduced in the current decade. Many of the jobs taken up by 
minority communities are low paid and precarious. The very specific 
manifestations the ethnic inequalities take in various districts show 
that the problem must be tackled on a local level alongside a national 
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strategy. As the universality of the inequality dictates, it is not just a 
challenge for local authorities with particularly diverse or deprived 
populations, but rather, an issue that all districts should take action on.
Tackling racial inequality must be considered at the conception of 
any ‘levelling up’ programmes. Both universal and targeted measures 
will be needed at different times, in different areas and for different 
communities. This is nuanced and difficult work, which requires local 
authorities to think and act in novel ways. It requires both will and 
resources. While the resurgence of the Black Lives Matter Movement 
globally might encourage the will, the economic impacts of the Covid-19 
pandemic and Brexit risk robbing the resources and diverting attention. 
The Covid effect
The Covid-19 pandemic shone a spotlight on the social and economic 
inequalities that have always blighted Britain’s black and brown 
communities. The crisis showed that racial discrimination is a social 
determinant of health. People from minority communities or more likely 
to have been doing precarious low paid work. This means they are most 
likely not to qualify for help from the Government’s coronavirus support, 
which focused on businesses and the full time employed.  Black and 
Asian people are more likely to be key workers or public-facing in some 
way, meaning that they are more likely to come into contact with 
someone who is carrying the virus. The precarious nature of much of 
the work carried out by black and Asian people means they are less able 
to take time off from work, to either shield or to quarantine themselves. 
Moreover, minority ethnic people are more likely to live in overcrowded 
homes, and this makes social distancing much more difficult. All of 
these factors combine to explain the alarmingly high number of black 
and Asian people who contracted (and died from) the virus. 
Public Health England’s analysis of survival among confirmed Covid-19 
cases showed that, after accounting for the effect of sex, age, 
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deprivation and region, people of Bangladeshi ethnicity had around twice 
the risk of death when compared to people of White British ethnicity. 
People of Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Other Asian, Black Caribbean and 
Other Black ethnicity had between 10 and 50% higher risk of death 
when compared to White British.6 Even for people who survive the 
pandemic, the economic cost is going to be high. People and parents 
will be expected to spend money they might not have on IT equipment, 
software and broadband. Black, Bangladeshi and Pakistani households 
have 10p of wealth for every £1 a white person has, and so, are ill-
equipped to deal with this impact. The closure of schools, with their 
guaranteed interaction and food provision, will have also presented 
challenges for those wishing to work but unable to without the free child 
care. Sadly, we know that the worst is yet to come, regardless of how 
many waves of Covid-19 we have. 
Homeless charity Shelter reported that 322,000 private renters7 have 
fallen into arrears since the pandemic started and said that 170,000 
had been threatened with eviction.8 This was while the eviction ban 
and furlough scheme was still in place so the real scale of the issue is 
likely to be much more severe. Many people were quite rightly worried 
about the plight of those working in the hospitality industry, which was 
particularly badly hit by the pandemic. The industry employs 3.2 million 
people. When we remember that black, Asian and minority ethnic Britain 
is made up of at least 8.1 million people, specific targeted interventions 
for this group should be every bit as much in demand.
Race, migration and class and messaging
As well as tackling systemic racism at a policymaking level, we need to 
provide counter-narratives to messaging, which seeks to either blatantly, 
or subtly, use race and migration in ways which encourage animosity 
and mistrust. 
Many have been increasingly horrified at the ramping-up of the hostile 
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environment under Home Secretary Priti Patel, who floated ideas in the 
media, ranging from sending asylum seekers 4,000 miles away to the 
colonial outpost of the Ascension Islands,9  a wave machine to repel 
immigrants aboard inflatable dinghies,10 or even deploying nets in the 
English channel to catch them.11 These stories have all the hallmarks of 
a deliberate and concerted attempt to stoke the ‘culture war’, to define 
who belongs and who does not. Who makes the grade as a ‘native’ and 
who is an outsider who has come to exploit Britain’s fabled generosity? 
Immigrants are the most legislated-upon group of people in society. 
Since the early 1990s, there has been, on average, a piece of legislation 
on immigration every other year, with each Act progressively more 
pernicious. As Sivanandan put it:
What it will really take to level up
The fight against racism is connected to the fight against immi-
gration laws, asylum and anti-terrorism, anti-terrorism to racism 
(anti-Muslim racism in particular), asylum and immigration, im-
migration, and so on. Moreover, they are all related in one way or 
another to the erosion of civil liberties, imperial foreign policy and 
the rise of the authoritarian state.12
“
Legislation has continued to draw lines between ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ 
migrants, ‘the best and the brightest’ and the rest. These distinctions 
are as artificial as those between immigrants (foreigners) and ex-pats 
(Brits moving abroad), or the exceptions made for white Australians, 
New Zealanders and South Africans compared to black and brown 
immigrants. 
For instance, David Goodhart has argued that ‘absorbing 100,000 
Australians is very different to 100,000 Afghans’, and has frequently 
sought to blur the lines between immigration and race by putting 
statistics about people of colour and people born abroad ‘side by side’.13 
Immigration has long been a proxy for race14 in the broader sense, 
typically embracing people of colour more generally. 
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Maya Goodfellow wrote: 
Twisted to apply to specific groups of people at particular times, there 
is no hard and fast rule of who is an immigrant and who isn’t. In the 
public debate, ‘immigrant’ comes to mean all kinds of different things; 
messy and shifting, it is, at times, conflated with race or ethnicity, and 
it’s applied to people seeking asylum or who have refugee status.15
“
From inconsistencies about who is an immigrant to the blurring of 
immigration and race to impact on British-born people of colour no 
matter how many generations ago their ancestors came to Britain. The 
hostile language used in tandem with rhetoric about welcoming those 
deemed to be a ‘good immigrant’ who will add economic value, or ‘win 
races or bake good cakes.’16 These are just some of the contradictions at 
the heart of the ‘culture war’ used to drive communities apart.  
However, with immigration and race being so closely bound together the 
challenge is not merely to unpick the contradictions, or indeed to appeal 
to a sense of generosity by advancing the financial-based argument that 
more immigrants enrich the country with a net economic contribution. 
Instead, the task is to promote both fairness and humanity and highlight 
the common interests and barriers shared by the multi-ethnic working 
class.  Namely, the white working class British, the black and brown 
working class British, and migrants, versus the unfair and often unearned 
advantage and privilege enjoyed by those with power and wealth. The 
antidote to this unfairness is equality, which is better for everyone.17
This is where ‘framing’ comes into play. The processes by which we 
frame issues by making reference to peoples’ values and ‘common 
sense’ as a means of softening negative influences and promoting 
positive and progressive values in its place. This can be achieved by 
identifying how frames and language used by campaigners can be 
adapted to win arguments, make analogies stick, and build the case 
for change. Some work on immigration framing has been done,18 but 
there is an urgent need to develop framing around race. The CLASS 
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and Runnymede Trust race and class project has produced some initial 
work on challenging divide and rule narratives19 around race and class 
messaging.20 This suggested that a combination of telling modern and 
historical stories set in a background of the common struggle for rights 
and dignity is the way forward.
Furthermore, there is a need to move the blame from the individual to 
the institution, from the workers to the decision-makers who do the 
hiring and firing, and away from the multi-ethnic working class to the 
affluent white middle classes who are the most segregated segment 
of society.21 It is through this class lens that we can make a case for 
equalising life-chances for all races, and through a race lens that we 
can make sense of class. From the brutal enslavement of Africans 
for financial gain, the extractive exploitation of colonialism, to the 
dark Satanic mills of Dickensian poverty in Britain, the foundations of 
capitalism have been built on the demonisation of the working class 
compounded with racist depictions of people of colour to justify the 
unjustifiable. 
Nevertheless, we can, and should, build solidarity across such 
differences. Shared identity can emerge from shared conditions but 
also shared values, shared history of past struggles, willingness to 
support each other, and a sense of pride in and belonging to local 
neighbourhoods.22 This solidarity can be forged from a class and race 
analysis that unequivocally pinpoints the enemy, which is underpinned 
by bold policies aimed squarely at combatting systemic discrimination 
and transforming the ‘system’ by taking on capital, vested interests, and 
the institutions that uphold the privilege and down press on immigrants, 
people of colour and the white working class.
We need to weave together ideas around race and class into one 
coherent vision to enshrine the goal of eliminating race inequality from 
the economy simultaneously with tackling class disparities as a single 
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narrative of dismantling common barriers. This must be one of the 
core missions of progressives seeking transformative change. Race 
and class analysis can work together to create an enhanced form of 
anti-racism, in much the same way that the Green New Deal blends 
socialism and environmentalism; two sides of the same coin.
Universal and targeted responses
Developing policies and responses to economic racism will require 
work across multiple platforms and in multiple arenas. Just as the 
Government’s plans to ‘level up’ based on geography will need both 
universal and targeted approaches, the same is true of tackling ethnic 
inequality. Policy responses will need to be informed by the people bearing 
the brunt of the inequality. Further, while our decision-making bodies 
are still mostly unrepresentative of the populations they administer, the 
routes for influencing policy from the grassroots need to be strengthened. 
Unfortunately, the voluntary sector that supports these grassroots 
groups, and often has the best analysis on how to help marginalised 
communities, are themselves struggling after years of underfunding. 
In the report, The Economic Downturn and the Black, Asian and minority 
ethnic (BAME) third sector 2009,23 Race on the Agenda reported that 
in London, funding cuts following the recession had hit the voluntary 
and community sector hard, and that BAME supporting organisations 
were particularly harshly impacted.24 Another study found that not only 
was the BAME third sector mostly unsuccessful in grant applications, 
but also, that the funding pots available rarely matched the needs.25 
In some cases, this saw BAME charities losing up to a fifth of their 
annual income. At the precise time that people from black and Asian 
communities needed support, the organisations that specialised in 
helping them were having to find ways of doing more with less.
The voluntary sector will be needed again to help black and Asian 
BA
M
E 
Co
m
m
un
iti
es
  8
4
What it will really take to level up
communities which are likely to be hardest hit in any post-Covid-19, 
post-Brexit downturn, but unfortunately, the sector is in worse shape 
than it was a decade ago. Local authorities have caused some of this, 
having sought savings generalising their services and moving away 
from culturally specific contracting.26 Whether we are looking at ways 
to nurture organisations which support minority ethnic communities, or 
developing policies which respond directly to the inequalities, we should 
be considering the duel aims of both providing opportunities for those 
who are currently denied these opportunities, but also, of creating a 
more just, cohesive society.27 Moreover, should a group have a specific 
need, a  policy should be implemented that actually responds to the 
need, rather than some proxy or universal application which misses the 
mark. More generally, justice requires that we give priority to the needs 
of the worse-off first.
Here the lessons on race and class are both complementary and 
divergent. Where a targeted policy to increase the voice or participation 
is known to work, and where both ethnic minorities and working-class 
people lack such voice or representation, the policy can and should be 
applied to both groups. An example here is a positive action, an example 
that also points to the need to implement the socio-economic duty in the 
Equality Act (2010). There are then many targeted policies that could be 
similarly deployed in response to race and class inequalities. However, 
there are some such policies that might not be so extended. Three 
examples are race equality training for employees in the criminal justice 
system to challenge stereotypes about black men; English-language 
provision for migrants; and an industrial or economic development 
policy that ensures better (or any) jobs for working-class communities. 
On this latter point, a key reason why Race and Class in post-Brexit 
Britain communities feel ‘left behind’ or otherwise excluded is because 
in many working-class communities there is no longer the sort of work 
that helped define that community and provide individuals with meaning 
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and self-worth. The idea that a nostalgic form of ‘white Britishness’ 
could fill this hole while offering neither employment, resources, nor 
access to decision-making institutions is profoundly desperate – and 
dangerous. Instead, we must build responses that react to the need for 
dignity and meaning, needs that must be accompanied not only by a 
vague sense that the community matters, but by real opportunities for 
employment and representation.
 
It may be particularly important or useful if people support a targeted 
policy for a group other than themselves. So to build shared interests or 
a common sense of belonging, we should support policies that benefit 
other groups and not our group, and expect similar support in return. 
This will both ensure that we support policies on the grounds of justice 
rather than out of self-interest, and make us understand other people’s 
experiences better. A final point here, however, is that when supporting 
policies to benefit others, it is not enough to build shared interests or 
something more substantial – say, solidarity. Understanding other 
people’s experiences will require a much bolder and explicit admission 
of the past and ongoing racism that affect how British (working-class or 
otherwise) identity expresses itself.
The Capitalist Elephant in the room
When looking at any measures to improve the economic condition, we can not 
ignore the fact that the way our economy runs has racism baked in to its core. 
It is often said that we are not going to achieve real race equality in a capitalist 
system, and that simply promoting ‘black capitalism’ and seeing the number 
of black millionaires increase will do little or nothing to help communities held 
back by race and class barriers. The existing economic orthodoxy has proven 
incapable of addressing inequalities, with a direct correlation between income 
inequality and health and social problems.
Our economic system has been built on the dual pillars of financial 
exploitation of enslavement and colonialism abroad, and oppression of the 
working classes at home. Financial institutions, like the Bank of England, and 
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investment houses, were formed to administer the ill-gotten gains of 
slavery.28 Expecting a system, which was specifically designed to extract 
wealth from one type of person (or from particular parts of the globe), 
in order to concentrate it in the hands of a few, to provide the solutions 
to the racism on which it suckled at birth seems hopefully optimistic. 
However, it is the system we have, and until there is a seismic shift 
in power and who wields it, the best we can work towards is ways to 
mitigate some of the harm done.
Today, the economy relies heavily on extractive industries that exploit 
the natural resources of developing countries and cause environmental 
destruction most acutely felt in the Global South. Where often workers 
earning the least - such as miners in Africa’s Congo basin - are toiling 
for highly-profitable business in the West such as mobile phone 
companies.29
Black Lives Matter embodies a movement focused on radical 
redistributive policy for all black people, rather than simply more 
businesses in BAME communities facing the same challenges in 
being awarded bank loans.30 In Britain, banks are more likely to close in 
deprived areas, and fee-charging cash machines are more concentrated 
in these areas as well. BAME communities are more likely to have poorer 
credit ratings,31 with a consequential impact on access to credit and 
homeownership.  
Economics - including the teaching of it - remains centred around 
whiteness, and many anti-racist struggles are in essence, struggles 
against economic injustice that results from baked-in racism not just 
from institutions but from the economy itself.  Rev Dr Martin Luther King 
Jnr was acutely aware of the need for economic redistribution and the 
antidote to economic inequalities faced by black people, and he sought 
to build a multi-racial ‘Poor People’s Campaign’ to demand economic 
justice.32
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In the United States, there is such a history of the establishment of 
black banks from the 1880s, many started by black churches in the 
face of Jim Crow barriers to credit. However, the UK does not have 
such a history, and likewise there has been less reliance on community 
‘pardners’ and other self-reliance systems of retaining the ‘black pound’ 
within communities. US black banks, college education funds, etc., are 
based on the principle of ‘black capitalism’, making it easier for some 
to succeed or for social mobility to be more equitable. Yet the failure of 
this approach is to ignore the many who are left behind and held back by 
systemic barriers that condemn those communities disproportionately 
to poverty.
We need to extend asset ownership to all working people, with an 
emphasis on excluded communities, much as Margaret Thatcher did 
with middle-earners, and expand access to credit for all to overcome 
extractive rentierism.35 Achieving equality also demands that the state 
does not only put in place measures to enforce equal outcomes, but 
that they direct investment and capital towards those goals, to shift the 
balance of power towards oppressed communities to take control of 
their communities, their workplaces, and their lives; it allows people to 
come together to build a better world.
Conclusion
Any genuine attempts to ‘level up’ the UK for the whole nation will need 
to pay close attention to ethnic inequalities if it is to be effective. Black, 
Asian, and minority ethnic communities often face multiple inequalities 
at once, and so, a combination of both universal and targeted policies 
will be needed. We need a Race Equality Act to underpin a state 
commitment to work towards eliminating racial disparities in the public 
and private sectors with policies and resources to match the scale 
of the challenge. Besides, as local authorities develop policies tackle 
geographic inequalities; they must also consider the specific nature of 
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inequalities in their area. This is relevant for all areas regardless of the 
size of their minority ethnic communities. Specific measures should also 
be taken to nurture the BAME supporting voluntary sector, and this must 
include capacity building as well as project funding. Alongside tackling 
racial, economic inequality, negative narratives about migrants need to 
be challenged, and our immigration policies need to be detoxified, and 
a new narrative around the multi-ethnic working class and common 
barriers developed. Last but by no means least, when tackling racial 
inequality we must consider global inequalities and the role Britain plays 
in exploiting the global South for its resources and people.
Maurice Mcleod is Chief Executive of ROTA (Race on the Agenda). 
Additional contributions from Lester Holloway, CLASS.
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”
           Greater equality 
pays dividends at every 
stage of human life, 
from the cradle 
to the grave.
The road to health 
equality
Chapter 6
Kailash Chand
Introduction
If life were a race, talk of ‘levelling up’ the playing field so that all can finish 
would require genuine reflection on who has a head start; who starts 
at the back, and what are the obstacles that make completing the race 
so much harder for some. Or in the case of ill-health, who does not get 
to finish the race at all. Care must be taken to understand how different 
kinds of inequalities - between race, gender, class, place - interact and 
interlink in order to tackle it. Hence, through an intersectional lens, this 
essay will examine the government’s attitude to health inequality, and 
inequality more generally, before discussing what health inequality looks 
like in the UK today, and the impact of Covid-19, and the causes of such 
disparities. Finally, this paper will detail what the government must 
propose if they are serious about their ‘levelling up’ agenda.
The government’s response to health inequalities
The Covid-19 health crisis and ensuing recession and rising 
unemployment have and will continue to worsen the disparities between 
BAME communities and their white counterparts, men and women, 
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the more and the less educated, the young and older, and between 
ordinary working people and the wealthy. The pandemic is revealing 
and exaggerating the longstanding and intricately linked inequalities in 
health and wealth and has brought to the attention of the wider public 
how these disparities have always intersected with race. Sickness 
and death do not come equally to all, especially not Covid-19 deaths. 
What has previously been ignored must finally be acknowledged: racial 
inequality is a determinant of health. BAME people are more likely 
to be key workers, doing public-facing, or low paid precarious work, 
increasing their exposure to the virus.
Following the issues of structural racism brought to the attention by 
the Black Lives Matter movement, the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson 
has announced yet another inequalities review.1 Writing in the Daily 
Telegraph, Johnson said the Commission on Race and Ethnic 
Disparities would look at ‘all aspects of inequality – in employment, in 
health outcomes, in academic and all other walks of life.’2 Johnson told 
broadcasters that, ‘what I really want to do as Prime Minister, is change 
the narrative, so we stop the sense of victimisation and discrimination. 
We stamp out racism, and we start to have a real sense of expectation 
of success.’
Johnson is not the first politician to make such announcements, and 
he won’t be the last, but rarely do they follow it up with concrete action. 
Frankly speaking, we do not need another review or Commission. We 
have countless reports. What we need are action and implementation. 
To name just a few: we have 35 specific recommendations in the 
Lammy review, which looked into discrimination within our policing 
and criminal justice systems.3 Implement them. There are 110 
recommendations in the Angiolini review into deaths in police custody. 
Implement them. Thirty recommendations in the Home Office review 
into the Windrush scandal. Implement them. 26 recommendations 
in Baroness McGregor-Smith’s review into workplace discrimination.4 
Implement them. We have the policies in Roger Kline’s report, which 
looked into the ‘snowy white peaks’ of governance and leadership of 
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the NHS and how this impacts patient care.5 Implement them. We 
have Sir Michael Marmott’s report and action plan, a landmark study 
of health inequalities, that found that health inequalities are widening, 
and life expectancy is stalling.6 The report was published a decade ago 
when the Tories first came into power. Implement them. The Wendy 
Williams Windrush Review (immigration);7 the Timpson Review (school 
exclusions);8 the Parker Review (FTSE100 boards)9 - implement them 
all. That is what the Prime Minister must do. 
This Commission will waste precious time that we do not have. 
Six months since the first outbreak and the UK is in much the 
same position. The second wave of Covid-19 infections will again 
disproportionately impact both the health and finances of the multi-
ethnic working-class communities. The prime minister says he wants 
to ‘level up’ the country, which includes health, but nothing in his 
government’s policies nor rhetoric suggests an acceptance that ill-
health is directly related to inequality, viz a vis, levels of poverty.10 It is 
also unlikely, given past utterances and multiple U-turns, that Johnson 
recognises the need for early intervention for significant impacts in 
regards to health outcomes, rather than short-term reactionary policy. 
Moreover, as an MP and cabinet minister, Johnson supported the cuts 
that withered the state so much that every child could not possibly have 
the opportunity to flourish and succeed in life.11
What do health inequalities look like in the UK today?
Most of my working life in the NHS has focused on exposing and 
tackling inequalities in health – understanding how the circumstances 
in which people are born, grow, live, work, and age impacts one’s health. 
There is no doubt that the NHS has been chronically underfunded, 
and the privatisation of services has only been detrimental to our 
communities. Nevertheless, the uncomfortable truth is that structural 
inequalities follow individuals from the womb to the tomb. It is the 
circumstances of one’s life, the poverty, stress and insecurity that a 
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person experiences, which contributes to health inequalities, rather than 
defects in our healthcare system. Of course, statin deficiency leads to 
heart disease and a lack of hypotensive agents leads to a stroke, but 
the reason this is more likely to occur to some, and not others have 
everything to do with the underlying factors determined by the social 
and economic arrangements of society. As such, areas with a high 
burden of disease, deprived areas, places with lower productivity and 
higher unemployment overlap.12 Hence, the most powerful positive 
policies for health outcomes is an investment in social housing, social 
security, early years centres, youth services and good quality work.13
The pandemic has shone a stark light on the overlapping inequalities 
and how it affects one’s health. Death has not come equally to all, 
especially not Covid-19 deaths. Covid-19 infections and death are 
structured by sex, age, race and ethnicity, education, the level of 
deprivation and geography. Pre-existing inequalities shape who dies 
and who lives, just as the pandemic itself creates new disparities. 
Although the virus may have infected both Prince Charles and Boris 
Johnson, demonstrating that no one is immune, the ONS study found 
that those infected in the most deprived communities in inner cities 
were much more likely to die.14 Some of the poorest parts of London, 
where population density is high, housing quality is abysmal, were 
hardest hit. Coronavirus killed 86 people per 100,000 in the capital, 
compared with an average of 36 people across the whole of England 
and Wales, according to the ONS. This is not just a fact of coronavirus, 
the truth is, if one is living in poverty, they are more likely to get ill 
quicker and die sooner.
Our health is determined by a complex mix of factors including income, 
housing and employment, lifestyles and access to health care and other 
services. Sir Michael Marmot’s report clearly shows that inequalities 
have worsened in the last ten years, especially for women.15 There has 
been a noticeable decrease in the proportion of our lives that we can 
expect to live in good health.16 The social gradient has become steeper 
over the last decade, and it is women in the most deprived 10% of areas 
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for whom life expectancy fell from 2010-12 and 2016-18. In 2016-18, 
life expectancy in the least and most deprived areas differed by 9.5 
years for men and 7.7 years for women in 2016-18, rising from 9.1 and 
6.8 respectively in 2010-12. The leading cause of death for women is 
dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, responsible for 15.8% of deaths, with 
heart disease second at 8.3%. Experts say lives are lost to preventable 
and treatable diseases as a result of rising poverty.
Place also matters. Not only has the health gap grown between wealthy 
and deprived areas, but it has also grown between deprived areas.17 
Public Health England (PHE) recently mapped mortality rates across the 
country so that local people and councils can see where they rank for 
premature deaths from the four leading killers: cancer, lung disease, liver 
disease, and heart disease and stroke.18 The figures show that people 
living in the worst economic performing area, are more than twice as 
likely as people in prosperous areas, to die before the age of 75. Living 
in a deprived area of the North East is worse for one’s health than living 
in a similarly deprived area in London, to the extent that life expectancy 
is nearly five years less. This can, in part, be explained by the public 
funding cuts of the last decade, which has had the most impact on the 
most deprived communities outside of London and the South-East. 
Public sector spending on services went from 42% of GDP in 2009-10 to 
35% in 2018-19. Some of the most deprived 20% of authorities, such as 
Liverpool, suffered the most significant funding cuts.19
In the face of a worsening demographic picture nationally, local 
authorities have now been asked by this government to find additional 
in-year savings of millions. The King’s Fund described this as ‘the 
falsest of false economies’– a judgement it seems difficult to disagree 
with. Besides, there will be considerable pressure on the public health 
function in England in the coming months and years to deliver short-
term savings. Perhaps the most significant impediment faced would 
be the reduction of funding from the social care budget, causing the 
passage of older patients through the system to grind to a halt.
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What ‘Levelling Up’ means for health in the UK?
Politicians and policymakers openly recognise the relationship between 
the state of the economy, lifestyle and poor health. In his first speech 
as health secretary, Matt Hancock said everyone has a part to play in 
preventing ill health, ‘from the education we receive to the home we 
live in to, to the job we do… all of this shapes our physical and mental 
health.’20 But what has he done to walk the talk? Surely, there can be 
no greater social injustice than people dying sooner due to poverty. 
Professor Marmot’s devastating report shows that after ten years of 
grinding austerity, health inequalities are actually widening. There is 
more to inequality than just income. But, as the Nobel prize winner, 
Amartya Sen has long argued,21 and as I have discussed in this essay, 
income inequalities affect the lives people can have, which determines 
one’s health. To lead a flourishing life, people need a fair society. This is 
the premise from which we derive the policies required to ‘level up’.
First of all, the plethora of reviews and reports tell us the solutions 
are there, but what is missing is the political will to implement. Time 
for action to implement a package of policies during the term of this 
parliament, which will lay the foundations for real improvement over 
the long-term. Boris Johnson’s massive majority in 2019 election was 
because of support from ‘red wall’ areas that are at the sharp end 
of rising health inequalities; he now has a real opportunity to show 
leadership on improving health. ‘Levelling up’ will require the government 
to go further than investment in infrastructure – building bridges, train 
lines and new hospitals. It must invest in the circumstances in which 
people live that have powerful impacts on their health and wellbeing – 
such as poverty, employment, housing and education.
If Boris Johnson wants to ‘level up,’ invariably the place to start is 
to reverse the swathe of public health cuts to council budgets and 
substantially increase primary care funding. Although it is difficult to 
accurately quantify spending on community health services because of 
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gaps and inconsistencies in national data, most estimates suggest that 
around £10 billion of the NHS budget is spent on community services 
each year, this would need doubling in next five years to adequately 
fund essential services such as Adult Social Care Sure Start.22
Furthermore, to genuinely level up, the Prime Minister needs to take 
action to implement the six recommendations Sir Michael Marmot 
highlighted in his report published in February, ‘Fair Society Healthy 
Lives’.23
1. Give every child the best start in life. Time and time again, 
Conservative governments have put the state at the service of the 
wealthy rather than the poor: more than 4 million children now live 
in poverty. What happens in pregnancy and early childhood impacts 
on physical and emotional health through to adulthood. Even the  
All Party Parliamentary Group for Conception to Age Two says that 
tackling problems associated with early life should be no less a 
priority for politicians and health and social care professionals than 
national defence. This means eradicating child poverty, through 
a robust social security system, and reversing the Torie’s closure 
of Sure Start and Early Years Centres. It is worth noting that 
disadvantaged children who were the first to use Labour’s flagship 
Sure Start scheme were less likely to be overweight by the time they 
were five, were in better health and had less chaotic home lives. 
2. Enable all children, young people and adults to maximise 
their capabilities and have control over their lives. The graded 
relationship between socioeconomic position and the educational 
outcome has significant implications for subsequent employment, 
income, living standards, behaviours, and mental and physical 
health.  If we are serious about reducing both social and health 
inequalities, we must maintain the focus on improving educational 
outcomes across the gradient. 
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3. Create fair employment and good work for all. Being in good 
employment is protective of health; conversely, unemployment 
contributes to poor health. In the short term, it is essential to raise 
the minimum wage to a Real Living Wage for 18+ and lift the 
public sector pay cap, to set a wage standard across the labour 
market. Further, Rishi Sunak must limit the severity of employment 
disruptions now, which is known to have long term consequences 
to income levels and ill-health. To continue the furlough scheme, 
while the health crisis continues, to ensure people’s jobs and 
livelihoods. Furthermore, moving towards a four-day working week 
(without reducing pay) would reduce stress, give people back 
time to shop and cook healthy meals, sleep sufficiently, exercise 
regularly, dedicate to caring responsibilities and spend more time 
with their friends and families.  Further, investment into tackling 
climate change and transitioning to a green economy and fully 
funding our health and social care services would create much 
needed secure, well paid, unionised jobs. 
4. Ensure a healthy standard of living for all. Having insufficient 
money to lead a healthy life is a highly significant cause of health 
inequalities, not only does the minimum wage needs to reflect 
that, but social security needs to be raised to match the Real Living 
Wage, to eradicate poverty. Furthermore, public health grants to 
local authorities to be explicitly targeted for low-income families.
5. Create and develop healthy and sustainable places and 
communities. It is vital to build social capital at a local level to 
ensure that policies are both owned by those most affected and are 
shaped by their experiences.
6. Strengthen the role and impact of ill-health prevention. Our 
NHS needs a new model of healthcare – one which aims to 
prevent ill-health early instead of playing ‘catch-up’. It needs proper 
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transparency and accountability. If politicians are to remain involved 
at the heart of the NHS, then it should be to ensure it gets the 
funding it needs, not to ready it for an insurance-based system.
Following from the final point, it is essential to note that the NHS was 
created at a time when the vast majority of people were left to die or live 
with a health issue, and so health services were built around treatment 
rather than prevention. This has never been corrected, and we see the 
ramifications of this today. Successive politicians have lost sight of the 
path to securing an affordable NHS, which is to tackle the root causes 
of ill health to prevent sickness rather than only treating the symptoms. 
Today, soaring levels of obesity and type 2 diabetes have strained the 
treatment model to breaking point. Moreover, too much unnecessary 
surgery and prescriptions of statins and antidepressants place 
avoidable strain on the service. Quick fixes are continually prioritised 
over the promotion of light exercise or a clampdown on junk food 
corporations. Poverty, lack of resources to one’s disposal, poor town 
planning, weak infrastructure and poor-quality housing with precarious 
stressful employment fuel health problems that ultimately cost the 
NHS billions that it does not have.
Conclusion
Concluding remarks:
Even in the midst of multiple crises, NHS England should not lose focus 
on the long term and potentially genuinely transformative interventions, 
directed for example towards changing unhealthy behaviours and 
addressing the social determinants of health. After all, healthy lifestyle 
principles are far more powerful than anything a doctor could do for their 
patients. However, this requires holistic policies which work to improve 
people’s quality of life. A failure to act early comes at significant cost, not 
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only to individuals but to society as a whole. By spending more money 
on public health and social care for prevention, incrementally less will be 
spent on the NHS to treat the illnesses. Because by directing the funds 
to public health and social care, we will eventually see less demand and 
fewer issues in the NHS. A heart attack can cost £20,000 to treat. If it 
can be prevented, that has enormous cost implications for the NHS as 
well as for the well-being of the patient. I would estimate that something 
like 50% to 70% of my patients’ medical costs would not just be reduced 
but eliminated if they were enabled to have healthier diets, lifestyles and 
they were able to exercise more.
Ultimately, just like any other part of the planet, patients in this country 
hope for a health and social care system with the energy, passion and 
resources to bring about the kind of radical strategic change the UK 
needs to become a healthier and fairer society – which is how the World 
Health Organisation defines a healthy country. The task of levelling up, 
understood as raising the bottom, is a noble plan, after all in the world’s 
more equal countries, more infants survive, and people are generally 
healthier and happier. Greater equality pays dividends at every stage of 
human life, from the cradle to the grave.
Dr Kailash Chand OBE is honorary vice president of the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and has worked as a GP since 1983.
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             Replacing the culture of tox-
ic hyper-competition with 
                    values and skills of      
                       cooperation, trust,
                         compassion, 
                         collegiality and
                        caring, would make
                       children’s educational
                         experiences both
                           happier and more
                             harmonious.
The mantra of ‘levelling 
up’ in education has 
become a smokescreen 
for ‘levelling down’ the 
working classes
Chapter 7
Diane Reay
Introduction
Whilst the government’s ‘level up’ agenda is strong on rhetoric; it looks 
like a modest twist on existing policies rather than anything notably 
new, concluded Tomaney and Pike (2020).1  Even those on the right 
have questioned whether ‘levelling up’ is the right approach. Writing 
for the Social Market Foundation, Tim Pitt argues that talk of ‘levelling 
up’ avoids difficult questions around whether the levels of wealth and 
income accruing to the richest in society is problematic.2  For Boris 
Johnson, it is clear the only way is up. This view is evident in the PM’s 
June 2020 speech that ‘levelling up’ does not imply any ‘levelling 
down’ of the rich and powerful. Johnson’s assertions are based on the 
enduring fallacy that everyone can have the opportunity to be wealthy 
and successful, and that there is indefinite space at the top of society 
for everyone prepared to make enough effort to get there. This is the 
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fairy tale of meritocracy in British society, and such assertions ignore 
several brutal truths when it comes to the British education system.3 
The first truth is the importance of hierarchy and distinction for those in 
the upper echelons of society. Upper and middle-class sense of identity 
is closely related to the idea of being the ‘best’, and getting the highest 
grades.4 Such that, if the working classes were given the opportunity to 
catch up, then the upper and middle classes would do all within their 
power to differentiate themselves as at the top of the ladder.
Secondly, the assumption of a meritocratic system ignores the distinct 
lack of enabling resources for a decent education for those at the 
bottom of society. High-income levels and wealth buy not only intensive 
teacher attention, but also private tuition, and an endless array of 
enrichment activities to cultivate cultural and social capital, which is just 
as necessary as economic capital to get ahead. This manifests in the 
middle and upper classes as a sense of confidence, entitlement and 
useful social networks concerning education that the working classes 
are not in a position to acquire. ‘Levelling up’ requires addressing both 
the protection of their distinction by the middle and upper classes and 
the working class’s lack of economic, cultural and social capital.  
Since Brexit, regional inequalities have become the ‘go-to’ indicators 
of inequalities in UK society; much of the political rhetoric around 
‘levelling up’ focus on those ‘left behind’ areas which often deploys 
the crude North-South binary. A binary which conveniently overlooks 
a more complex geographical demographic. A more nuanced picture 
reveals Hastings in the South-East has a higher percentage of those 
‘left behind’ than Harrogate in the North West. Of the ten local districts 
with the highest percentage of Free School Meal (FSM) students, 
three are in London. Moreover, the area in the country with the highest 
concentration of FSM pupils - a third of the total - is Tower Hamlets in 
East London. 
In his June speech, Johnson pitched London as the wealth success 
story of the UK. However, inequality is far higher within London than 
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in any other part of the UK, with London over-represented at both the 
bottom and the top of the nation income distribution. 28% of Londoners 
live in poverty, compared with 22% across the UK as a whole.5 London 
has many affluent areas represented in the 224 schools in the city, with 
an average of 3% FSM pupils. Nevertheless, the North West, stereotyped 
as a left behind region, has even more pockets of affluence with over 
400 schools where on average only 3% of pupils are on FSMs.6 Rather 
than being rooted in reality, ‘the left behind’ rhetoric underpinning the 
‘level up’ agenda is primarily a political ploy to set one part of British 
society against another. There are ‘left behind’ schools in Britain, but they 
are in the South as well as the North, in our rural areas and small towns 
as well as our cities.
When it comes to the educational gap between London and the rest of 
the country, the ‘levelling up’ mantra neglects the impact of both ethnicity 
and the surrounding vibrant economic circumstances in the city. Where 
London is in some respects a success story is concerning the 45% of 
FSM students who go on to higher education by the age of 19, twice 
as many as the rest of the country except for the West Midlands and 
the North West. This is, in part, because different groups within the 
working class have different relationships to the UK educational system. 
While the white working classes, often bring a collective memory of 
educational subordination and marginalisation to schooling, some 
BAME groups bring family histories of educational achievement in their 
countries of origin. However, migration has often brought economic 
impoverishment and downward mobility. Others, despite a lack of 
educational credentials, bring a strong conviction that a fresh start in a 
new educational system will provide crucial opportunities for educational 
advancement that were denied to their parents.  However, other BAME 
groups, such as Black Caribbean pupils, have, like their white working-
class peers, learnt to live with educational failure compounded, in their 
case, by racism. Also, unlike their contemporaries in much of the rest 
of the country, young people in London can see myriad economic 
opportunities all around them. These differences add up to very different 
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educational outcomes and drive London’s much better educational 
performance compared to the rest of the country. 
How Levelling up becomes a form of levelling down
In the British education system, there is an on-going process of levelling 
- the ‘levelling down’ of the working classes.7 This is most evident in state 
schools in disadvantaged areas which are the most under-resourced; 
the most likely to have buckets collecting water from unrepaired roofs, 
to have food banks operating in their school halls, to have the narrowest 
curriculum, an impoverished pedagogy, the strongest focus on discipline, 
and the least SEND resources. Working class schools, in particular, 
suffer from dilapidated buildings, lack of resources, rapid staff turnover, 
inexperienced teachers, and an overreliance on standardised tests and 
basic skills. Instead of compensating for the poverty of the children 
attending their schools, the norm is now for the schools themselves to 
be impoverished in terms of infrastructure, resources and curriculum. 
Despite the often-heroic efforts of staff, these schools are increasingly 
reflecting the poverty of their locality rather than being enabled to 
redress it, thereby compounding social and educational inequalities. 
Furthermore, the link between funding and disadvantage is being 
weakened by a system which directs additional funding to more 
affluent schools with historically lower levels of funding. Behind the 
government’s talk of ‘level-up’ funding for 2020 to 2022 is a redirection 
of funding towards those schools that had previously been funded at a 
lower rate because of their more privileged intakes, i.e. including fewer 
FSM, EAL and SEND pupils.8  Hence, the so-called ‘level up’ funding is in 
effect ‘levelling down’ resources directed at the working classes and the 
schools they attend.9 The Education Policy Institute (EPI) found while 
FSM children received an allocation of 240 pounds more than non-FSM 
children, over the next year they will see increases of 0.6% compared to 
increase of 1.1 % for non-FSM pupils.10 Over the last three years, FSM 
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pupils have received increases of just two-thirds the rate of non-FSM 
pupils.11 The EPI concluded that efforts to ‘level up’ school funding in 
England would benefit better-off students more than their poorer peers.  
The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in the school lockdown, characterised 
by online lessons and zoom conferencing, which caused further ‘levelling 
down’ of working class children. This shift to remote learning during 
the lockdown period of March to June 2020 made the implications 
of children and young people’s unequal access to IT equipment and 
connectivity uncomfortably stark. When education went online, it was 
the poorest, who were disproportionately from BAME backgrounds, who 
were the most adversely affected.12 For many on low incomes, internet 
connection is slow, unreliable and only available on phone screens. 
This was the case in the UK as it was across the rest of the globe. In 
2017, only 47% of low income British households had home broadband, 
and low income BAME households had lower access than their white 
counterparts.13 Analysis of 2018 PISA data found that while more than 
70% of advantaged UK secondary school students had access to online 
learning platforms, only 40% of their disadvantaged peers had the same 
access.14 Even in normal times, this adds up to a glaring inequality divide, 
but in the time of Covid-19 with most children being home-schooled 
there was a growing clamour of concern that such a ‘digital divide’ 
severely harms poor pupils’ education, and widens the social class 
attainment gap.15  
One way the country should - and still could - have ‘levelled up’ digital 
inequalities would have been to provide free universal broadband.  The 
Labour Party Manifesto pledged to provide universal broadband free to all 
was the most derided of all its policies. Yet, it has now shown to be critical 
to giving the least advantaged children half a chance of keeping up with 
their more privileged peers.  Furthermore, government action to redress 
digital inequalities during the pandemic turned out to be distressingly 
inadequate with less than half of the children eligible for pupil premium 
in schools being allocated laptops under the Government scheme. The 
majority of eligible pupils still had not received laptops two months into 
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the school lockdown.16 By June, most schools had not received a single 
laptop for disadvantaged year ten pupils.17 Contrary to the rhetoric of 
‘levelling up’, Covid-19 has not been an equaliser. Instead, its impact has 
been to increase and solidify already existing educational inequalities. 
Recent research from NFER has revealed stark disparities in learning loss   
the school lockdown between the least and most deprived schools.18
Over half of teachers, in the most deprived schools, reported that their 
pupils were four months or more behind academically, compared with 
only 15 per cent of teachers, in the least deprived schools. 
Then there has been the government’s rescue package for ‘left-behind’ 
children for the 2020/21 school year. Rather than invest in state 
education by funding extra teachers and teaching assistants in working 
class schools to provide more learning support for those most in need, 
a majority of the money is going to the totally unregulated £2 billion 
private tutor industry.19  The government has decided to use over half 
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Figure 1.
Source: NFER survey of 1,782 classroom teachers: 1,408 teachers gave at least one response
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of the allocated money to commission private tutor agencies to deliver 
individual and small-group tuition. The remaining money going directly 
to schools is woefully inadequate, representing £80 pounds per student 
with no specification to be targeted at the most disadvantaged. It 
equates to just over 1% extra in spending per pupil in 2020 and would 
still leave spending per pupil more than 3% below its level in 2010 in real 
terms. The initiative may be a failure in terms of ‘levelling up,’ but it is a 
successful venture in terms of further privatising our state educational 
system. 
A further example of ‘levelling down’ has been the A-level debacle in 
August 2020, which resulted in a government attempt to ‘level down’ 
grades for working-class students not once but twice. The English 
government had intended to use an algorithm that moderated down 
the grades predicted by teachers for 39% of A levels. The Sutton Trust 
had already warned that these predictions were much more likely to 
be underestimated for working-class students than for their middle 
class peers.22  A public outcry forced the government to U-turn, but if it 
had been enforced the results would have resulted in private schools 
students achieving more than double the increase in the proportion of 
As and A*s  obtained by comprehensive state students and 15 times the 
increase in top grades gained by students in state sixth forms and further 
education colleges. Meanwhile, the algorithm would have led to a near-
five percentage point increase in the percentage of entries from private 
schools graded at A or A*, state sixth form and further education colleges 
would have seen their A and A* grades barely rise — up only 0.3 per cent. 
Public outrage at the prospect of grade inflation for the already 
privileged and little or nothing for the rest compelled the government 
to back down and revert to teacher assessments. However, while 75% 
of teacher predictions are over-estimates, research shows that teacher 
assessments still disadvantage high achieving working class students. 
High achieving (AAB or more) disadvantaged students are more likely to 
be under-predicted than their more advantaged counterparts. Research 
shows that almost 1,000 disadvantaged, high-achieving students a year 
have their grades under-predicted.23  Teacher assessments may be far 
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better than the now withdrawn algorithm, but they still constitute a form 
of ‘levelling down’ for many high attaining working class students.24
Lastly, it is wider processes of ‘levelling down’ in the form of growing 
child poverty that is inflicting the most enduring damage on working 
class children and young people. Of the 24 European countries 
surveyed by Pisa between 2015 and 2018, the UK had the largest 
growth in child poverty of 4%; this is at a time when poverty was falling 
across Europe on average by 2%.25
Despite all the rhetoric, there has been a concerted ‘levelling down’ of 
the working classes both in education and beyond, and Covid-19 has 
exacerbated this. The table above vividly illustrates the ‘levelling down’ 
of children’s life satisfaction in the UK and its correlations to growing 
child poverty. The latest research from the Children’s Society (2020b) 
shows that it is children living in poverty who are the most worried 
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What it will really take to level up
about coronavirus, further impacting on their already lower levels of 
well-being relative to their more affluent peers. 
What Levelling up would entail for education?
Despite the rhetoric, the depressing irony is that in twenty-first century 
Britain, there is more room at the bottom of society rather than at the 
top. Britain is not producing enough graduate jobs for all the graduates 
its universities are churning out. Instead, the real growth in jobs has been 
in traditional low skilled, often low paid jobs. Perhaps it is an opportune 
time to adopt RH Tawney’s understanding of how to build a just society. 
He argued:
Social well-being depends upon cohesion and solidarity. It implies the 
existence, not merely of opportunities to ascend, but of a high level 
of general culture, and a strong sense of common interests, and a 
diffusion  throughout society of a conviction that civilisation is not the 
business of an elite alone, but a common enterprise which is the con-
cern of all. And individual happiness does not only require that men 
(sic) should be free to rise to new positions of comfort and distinc-
tion; it also requires that they should be able to lead a life of dignity 
and culture, whether they rise or not. (Tawney 1964: 108).
“
As Tawney highlights, British education needs greater fairness and 
equality rather than ‘levelling up’. This would involve narrowing the 
gaps between rich and poor, both between and within geographical 
regions. A better, and less slippery, language than that of ‘levelling up’ 
would speak of two things: firstly, eradicating poverty across Britain, 
and secondly, the removal of all forms of special privilege in education.  
The former requires combining policies to make our education system 
fairer with progressive changes to our economy. As well as a socially 
just, redistributive tax system, we need regional regeneration of 
disadvantaged areas across all regions of the country.  Implementing 
the Real Living Wage across all sectors of the economy should be 
matched by a level of Universal Credit that works as a real safeguard 
Le
ve
llin
g 
do
w
n 
th
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 c
la
ss
  1
10
What it will really take to level up
against poverty alongside adequate funding to local government and 
other support services for children and families. The latter would entail 
the abolition of private schools but also the elitism that pervades the 
state sector and the elimination of practices of getting the best for one’s 
child if it is at the expense of other people’s children. In particular, the 
policy of parental choice of schools which currently encourages middle 
class parents to seek out class segregated schooling would need to be 
replaced by a system that both allocates school places fairly and ensure 
schools are socially mixed. 
Early years education has been neglected for over a decade and is 
largely viewed instrumentally by the government as a means of enabling 
people to access work. The UK spends 0.1% of GDP on early childhood 
education and care compared with an OECD average of 0.7% (Hansard 
2020). The consequence is a fragmented system of small-scale private 
providers that results in a postcode lottery in terms of availability and 
quality, and it is poorer parents who experience the worst provision. We 
should be demanding high-quality nursery provision by highly trained 
nursery practioners instead of the low standard warehousing of children 
by low paid workers so that parents can work. 
There needs to be a whole raft of policies to deal with the present crisis 
and address the consequences of austerity. Restoring funding to at 
least 2010 levels across the UK, plus instituting an equity principle of 
earmarking funding for the most deprived schools to receive funding 
first, would be the bare minimum necessary. However, any serious 
attempts to ‘level up’ would also provide free Broadband for poorer 
students, ensure every child had a laptop of their own, as well as 
providing all year free school meals.  
But many things would also need to change in classrooms. Crucially, 
the implementation of a broad and balanced curriculum that integrated 
the vocational with the academic from nursery onwards, which would 
enable far more children across differences of social class to experience 
educational success. Also, a curriculum that included learning about 
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What it will really take to level up
democracy, equality, environmental, social and political awareness for 
children from the age of 3 and 4 would ensure that critical thinking skills 
were at the core of children’s learning in place of the current remorseless 
focus on repetition, memorisation and routine learning.26  Further, 
replacing the culture of toxic hyper-competition with values and skills 
of cooperation, trust, compassion, collegiality and caring, would make 
children’s educational experiences both happier and more harmonious. 
This would necessitate getting rid of SATS, league tables, setting, 
and Ofsted. Research shows that all children benefit, but working-
class children benefit the most when the ethos of the classroom is 
underpinned by collaboration, not competition. 
The preoccupation with ‘levelling up’ focuses attention on how the 
bottom of British society might become more like the top, but a more 
productive dialogue would be about how to make the bottom a good, 
secure and valued place to be. Even better would be a focus on reducing 
hierarchy, and the social distance between different class groupings 
in British society, to the point where notions of top and bottom do not 
make sense anymore because we all feel we are in the middle. That 
would be a levelling worth having.  
Diane Reay is Professor of Education at Cambridge University.
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”
           The possibilities are 
only constrained by the 
ideology of the 
government of the day 
and its desire to rebuild 
society.
Financing the New 
Economy and Society  
Chapter 8
Prem Sikka
Introduction: An Unequal Britain
As the previous chapters have discussed, even before the Covid-19 
pandemic, the UK had high levels of inequalities. Out of a population of 
around 68 million, some 14 million live in poverty, including four million 
children and two million retirees.1 Some 12.8 million households have 
savings of £1,500 or less, and the household debt is around £1,680bn.2 
Foodbanks and charity shops selling second-hand clothes dominate city 
centres. Nearly three million Brits are malnourished and 1.3 million of 
these are over the age of 65. At around 29% of average earnings, the UK 
state pension is the lowest amongst industrialised nations. 
In 1976, workers’ share of the gross domestic product stood at 65.1%.3 
By the end of 2019, under the onslaught of anti-trade union laws, erosion 
of collective bargaining and zero hour contracts, it declined to 49.7%.4 
After adjusting for inflation, the earnings in real terms were £502 per 
week in October 2019, compared to £525 in February 2008 - a 4.3% 
reduction in real terms. 42% of UK adults have annual income of less 
than £12,500. In 2018, 4.7 million employees were in low pay.
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What it will really take to level up
The poorest fifth of society has only 8% of the total income, whereas 
the top fifth has 40%.5 The national share of income of the richest 1% 
of households has tripled over the last four decades from 3% in the 
late 1970s to around 8%.6 Around 10% of households hold 44% of all 
wealth, whilst the poorest 50% own just 9% and the top 0.1% hold 9%.7 
The effects of the socioeconomic policies are uneven across the UK. 
The richest parts located in London and South East of England are up 
to 30 times richer than the poorest.8 The number of UK regions with 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita below 75% of the EU average 
increased from three in 2008 to seven in 2017. The seven regions – 
Southern Scotland; West Wales and the Valleys; Cornwall and the Isles 
of Scilly; Lincolnshire; Tees Valley and Durham; South Yorkshire; and 
Outer London – East and North East – are all poorer than anywhere 
else in North West Europe.9 
The average life expectancy of a newborn baby boy and girl is around 
79.2 years and 82.9 years respectively. Men living in Blackpool, with 
one of the lowest amounts of disposable income, have an average 
life expectancy of 75 years compared to 83 years for those in the City 
of London. A girl born in affluent Buckinghamshire can expect to live 
for 87 years compared to 80 years in low income Middlesbrough. The 
healthy life expectancy is a good 15-20 years less than the average life 
expectancy. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has added new urgency. During the first six 
months of the pandemic, foodbanks have hand out nearly 1.2m meals 
to hungry Britons.10 Thousands of businesses have closed, jobs have 
been lost and many will never return. This requires bold economic 
action to restructure the economy, launch new industries, reskill and 
train the work force and redistribute income and wealth so that people 
have good purchasing power to build a sustainable economy.
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What it will really take to level up
Building a New Society 
Almost 250 years ago, the moral philosopher Adam Smith said: 
“No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far 
greater part of the members are poor and miserable”. This requires 
interventions from the state. The post-Second World War economy 
was built with active investment by the state in healthcare, education, 
biotechnology, information technology, telecommunications, steel, 
shipping, railways, airlines and much more – especially as the private 
sector showed little appetite for investing in emerging industries. The 
same is necessary again, and emerging industries ought to be located 
in hitherto disadvantaged regions. Any levelling up of the regions and 
the marginalised and excluded groups requires a restructuring of the 
economy and redistribution of income and wealth.
Inevitably, neoliberals will focus on how it will all be paid for. There are 
numerous policy options, and this section highlights some of these:
Modern Monetary Theory: The conventional economic wisdom is 
that government levies taxes and uses the revenues to finance public 
spending. In this logic if the revenues needed for financing regional or 
national renaissance are greater than the tax revenues, the government 
must borrow the difference and/or increase taxes. This wisdom is 
challenged by proponents of the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) who 
argue that the government can spend whatever it wants, subject to 
the inflation constraint by essentially creating its own money.11 MMT is 
worthy of further exploration, but is not currently embraced by any major 
political party. 
Quantitative Easing: Since the 2007-08 financial crisis the state has used 
£895bn of quantitative easing (QE) to support corporations and financial 
markets by buying up corporate bonds, real estate and securities.12 A 
people-centred QE can be used to finance new industries, purchase an 
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What it will really take to level up
equity stake in newer industries and fund their expansion. It can also be 
used to buy-up debts of the less well-off to give them a new start.
Ways and Means Facility: The government can fund regional or national 
investment through an overdraft from the Bank of England. It is officially 
known as the Ways and Means (W&M) facility and enables sterling cash 
advances from the Bank to the government.13 Ordinarily, a standing 
balance of around £0.4bn is maintained to support Exchequer cash 
management, but during the 2008 crisis, the government used £19.9bn 
of the W&M facility. The government maintains that W&M is intended to 
be a temporary measure, nevertheless, it is a tool for the government to 
manage liquidity, cash flows and social investment.
Borrowing: Governments can always borrow money to finance 
economic regeneration and social cohesion. This is highly feasible, 
especially as the current bank rate is at a historically low rate of 0.1% and 
has been at 0.5% or less since March 2009. The rate is unlikely to rise 
significantly for the foreseeable future. Neoliberals will inevitably claim 
that the government debt of £2,059.7bn, at the end of September 2020, 
amounting to 103.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) is too high.14 
Such objections have little substance. 
However in 1946, after the Second World War, the UK’s public debt stood 
at over 270% of its GDP.15 The government had borrowed extensively 
from the US and Canada for the war and the post-war reconstruction. 
The debt was brought down by expansionist policies that invested in 
industry and people, boosted employment and generated tax revenues. 
By 1976, it was reduced to 49% of GDP. The final and the 50th instalment 
of debt to allies was paid in 2006. It is hard to recall anyone panicking 
about government borrowing or it even being a topic of discussion by 
our parents and grandparents’ generation. A government can repay the 
debt over several decades. 
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What it will really take to level up
Clampdown on Tax Avoidance and Evasion: By its admission, HMRC 
failed to collect £31bn of tax revenues in 2019 due to avoidance, evasion, 
errors and other reasons.16 Technically, this is known as “tax gap,” i.e. 
the difference between taxes which are actually collected and what 
should be collected. For previous periods, HMRC estimates put the tax 
gap at around £34bn-£35bn a year. There is considerable disagreement 
about HMRC methodology, and other models estimate the tax gap to be 
between £58.6bn and £122bn a year.17  
Even the above estimates are likely to understate the leakage of tax 
revenues as they do not take adequate account of the profits shifted by 
corporations from the UK to low/no tax jurisdictions through complex 
corporate structures and artificial transactions relating to interest 
payments on intragroup loans, royalty payments, management fees and 
other practices which are perfectly legal. Some examples would help to 
illustrate the issues.
From December 2006 to March 2017, Thames Water was owned by 
Macquarie Bank representing a consortium of institutional investors 
from China and Abu Dhabi. For 11 years Thames operated through 
a labyrinth of companies, with some linked to Caymans.18 Thames 
shareholders averaged 15.5% to 19% a year.19 For the period of 
its ownership Macquarie and its investors received £1.2 billion in 
dividends, but this was not the only return. Thames Water was loaded 
with intragroup debt through the Caymans and other entities. Its debt 
increased from about £2.4 billion to £10 billion, and interest payments 
swelled the charges to customers. For the period 2007 to 2015, Thames 
paid £3.186 billion in interest to other entities in the group alone. This 
would have been paid without deduction of any withholding tax and 
entities in the Caymans and other low/no tax jurisdictions would have 
received the amounts tax free. At the same time, Thames water would 
have been able to claim a tax deduction for the interest payments. 
Thames Water paid about £100,000 in corporation tax for the period 
2007 to 2016.20 
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What it will really take to level up
In 2005 the Arcadia Group (connected with BHS) managed by Sir 
Philip Green paid a dividend of £1.3 billion. Around £1.2 billion was 
paid, without any withholding tax, to its main shareholder Lady Green 
who is resident in Monaco. Monaco does not levy an income tax. Lady 
Green did not pay any income tax on her dividend even though the UK 
infrastructure had been used to generate it. If she had been resident in 
the UK, or the UK government levied a withholding tax equivalent to the 
basic rate of income tax, she would have paid around £300 million in 
income tax.
In 2001, BHS entered into a sale and leaseback agreement with 
another company under the control of Lady Green, who was also the 
majority shareholder in BHS. A number of BHS properties were sold 
for £105,875,000 to Jersey-based Carmen Properties Limited and 
then immediately leased back. Between 2001 and 2015, BHS paid 
rents totalling £157,398,000 to Carmen. In effect, one Green controlled 
company was paying rent to another company under the same control. 
Jersey does not levy corporation tax on foreign profits, and £157 million 
was passed to Monaco-resident Lady Green, without any tax charge 
anywhere. BHS would have been able to reduce its taxable profits by 
£157 million and lower its tax liabilities.
The full extent of the use of intragroup and related party transactions 
to avoid taxes is not known. The introduction of a withholding tax, i.e. 
deduct tax equivalent to the basic rate of income tax before payment is 
made, on the payment of dividends, interest and transactions with rogue 
tax havens would check the shifting of profits. There is enormous scope 
for a clampdown on tax avoidance. The very conservative estimates 
are that during the last decade, the UK failed to collect between £300bn 
and £1200bn of tax revenues. Even a fraction of these, if collected by 
resourcing HMRC, would make a significant difference and provide 
resources for levelling-up the neglected regions.
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What it will really take to level up
Tax Reliefs: In pursuit of assumed economic objectives, successive 
governments have given a large number of tax reliefs, allowances 
and exemptions to reduce tax liability of selected businesses and 
individuals. There are more than 1,128 tax reliefs.21 The Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) stated that that the full cost of tax reliefs that support 
government’s economic and social objectives is not known and could 
exceed £159 billion a year. 
The PAC states that: 
...despite our repeated examination of this topic since 2013, HM 
Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) have made unaccept-
ably slow progress in improving their management of tax reliefs. It is 
staggering that they still have insufficient understanding of the cost 
and value for money of tax reliefs, as well as who benefits from them. 
Tax reliefs need rigorous challenge, as costs can be much higher than 
expected and their benefits are not always evident” (p. 3).
“
A former Head of HMRC urged the government to scrap the £2bn 
entrepreneurs’ tax relief because it provided ‘no incentive for real 
entrepreneurship.’23 Almost three-quarters of the relief went to just 
5,000 people. In the March 2020 budget, the government reduced the 
entrepreneurs’ relief. However, a full review of all reliefs is long overdue 
and can generate billions for social development.
Pension Contributions tax relief: Tax relief on payments into private 
pension schemes is one of the many tax reliefs given by the government. 
In 2018-19, this amounted to £38bn, but is unfair and exacerbates 
inequalities. The tax relief depends on the marginal rate of income tax 
of the person making the contributions. In general, high earners get tax 
relief on pension contributions at the rate of 40% and 45%, compared 
to 20% for the basic rate income tax payers. In view of the skewed 
distribution of income, the top 10% of earners receive 50% of the tax 
relief on pension contributions. Around 1.75 million low paid and part-
time workers earning less than the tax free personal allowance do not 
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What it will really take to level up
receive any benefit from the tax relief given on pension contributions 
even though they may be auto-enrolled to pension scheme through their 
employer.24
A more equitable approach would be to restrict the tax relief to 20% to 
all pension scheme contributors. This would also generate a surplus of 
£11bn a year which could be used for redistribution, public services or 
funding new industries.25
Reforming Capital Gains Tax: Currently, in England, income and capital 
gains are taxed at different taxes.
For the year 2020, a basic rate of income tax of 20% is levied on annual 
incomes between £12,501 and £50,000; 40% higher rate on incomes 
between £50,001- £150,000; and 50% on incomes over £150,000. At 
the same time the rates for capital gains tax (CGT) vary from 10% to 
28%, depending on the taxable income of the taxpayer and the nature 
of the capital gain. The tax rate differentials have created opportunities 
to convert income to capitals gains, and even vice-versa, if the 
circumstances are considered to be advantageous. If wealthy individuals 
succeed, they can pay tax at 28% rather than at the marginal rate of 
45%. In 2017-18, only 265,000 taxpayers paid £8.3bn in CGT on £58.9bn 
of taxable gains.26
The opportunities for tax avoidance can be curtailed by abolishing the 
distinction between capital gains and income. Capital gains are windfall 
gains and increase the purchasing power and potential consumption 
of the individual. There is no qualitative difference between the two. 
Capital gains should be added to the individual’s total income for the year 
and taxed at the appropriate marginal rates to reduce opportunities for 
avoidance. This reform can raise around £14bn a year or £90bn over a 
five year period for redistribution and investment.27  
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Corporation Tax: Corporations have been major beneficiaries of tax 
cuts. In 1982, the standard rate of corporation tax was 52%. By 2010 it 
declined to 28% and is currently 19% of taxable profits. An increase in the 
rate of corporation tax to 26% - the 2011 level - could raise £24bn over 
five year.28
Financial Transactions Tax: A Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (SDRT) on the 
purchase of secondary shares has been levied since 1694. The current 
rate is 0.5% of the transaction.29
Countries as diverse as Hong Kong, India, Switzerland, Taiwan and 
others also levy a tax on transactions relating to varieties of bonds, 
options and futures. The UK also levies a small tax on transaction is 
options and future.30
The Labour Party’s 2019 election manifesto sought to extend FTT to 
corporate bonds and equity and credit derivatives transactions, forex 
spot and derivatives trades, interest rate derivatives, and commodities 
spot and derivatives trades.31 The tax rates were to vary but ranged from 
0.01% to 0.12%, depending upon the nature of the transaction. Even at 
these modest rates, FTT was estimated to raise around £8.8bn over 
five years. There is a considerable scope to expand the base to cover all 
speculative transactions and the rate of FTT to raise higher revenues.
Wealth Tax: A wealth tax has long been talked about but has not been 
fully implemented. Some elements of it in the form of inheritance tax 
and capital gains tax have long been implemented with varying degrees 
of success.
The notions of a wealth tax raise considerable questions about definition 
of wealth and collection of data about wealth accumulation, but they 
can be addressed. European countries, such as Belgium, France, Spain 
and Switzerland apply wealth tax to selective assets at rates ranging 
from 0.15% to 2.5%. One study estimated that a one-off 2% tax of 
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the UK’s private wealth of £15 trillion could raise £300bn.32 Another 
estimate is that a levy of 2.5% on assets above a certain amount could 
raise £174bn.33 Of course, there would be considerable debates about 
exemptions and behavioural aspects. Nevertheless, it remains an option 
for generating revenues for social development..
Higher rate VAT on luxury goods: In January 2011, the standard rate 
of VAT was increased from 17.5% to 20%. A number of items, such 
as children’s clothing, essential foodstuffs, and postage stamps are 
exempt and some items, e.g. household energy have a lower rate of 
VAT. Additional revenues can be raised by charging a higher rate of VAT 
on the consumption of luxury goods. Whatever counts as luxury goods 
would need to be defined and can include fast cars, certain types of 
yachts, jewellery, clothing, handbags and artworks. One estimate is that 
VAT at the rate of 30% on certain luxury goods could raise £1.6 billion a 
year.34
Land Value Tax has touted as a possible replacement for the business 
rates system though it can be extended beyond that.35 The basic idea 
behind a land value tax (LVT) is that pieces of land get their value 
from their location rather than the quality of the development sitting 
on top of them.36 What gives the location its value is the surrounding 
infrastructure – land tends to be more valuable in the centre of a city 
with high footfall, or areas with good transport infrastructure, schools, 
hospitals, and so on. This infrastructure has not been paid for by the 
landowner, but rather generations of taxpayers. Therefore, in economic 
theory, land value tax is seen as an attempt to capture the value that 
has nothing to do with the owner’s efforts, to reimburse society. 
It is estimated that land value tax can enable local authorities alone to 
raise over £5bn a year though LVT can be used for other purposes too.
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Inequality tax: IIn the first three working days of a year, FTSE CEO’s 
earn as much as an average worker does in the whole year.37 FTSE 
100 CEO earned £3.46 million compared to the average worker salary 
of £29,559. Top bosses earn 117 times the annual pay of the average 
worker. 
Inequalities in the distribution of income have harmful consequences 
as they affect access to education, housing, healthcare, pension, food 
and security. They affect life expectancy, infant mortality, mental illness 
and social mobility. An inequality tax should be levied on a company or 
a similar organisation for inflicting harms emanating from inequitable 
distribution of income.  The remedy is to withdraw tax relief on 
excessive remuneration.
Currently, if an executive is paid £100m, all of it is tax deductible. If, the 
tax deductibility of executive/employee remuneration is capped at say 
£1m per person then that is all the company would be able to deduct 
as an expense in its corporation tax computation. The net result would 
be that corporation tax at the prevailing rate would be payable on the 
disallowed £99m. Those revenues can be used for redistribution and 
social investment.
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Conclusion
This chapter has drawn attention to a variety of ways in which the state 
can secure resources to rebuild society, redistribute income/wealth, 
‘level up’ the regions and people, invest in new industries and public 
services and eradicate poverty. Traditionalists may like to focus on the 
state’s borrowing and taxes as sources of revenues, but there are a 
considerable number of options. These include the state generating its 
own money, using quantitative easing and overdrafts.
The tax policies outlined in this chapter can raise significant revenues 
without increasing the basic rate of income tax; national insurance 
What it will really take to level up
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contributions or the standard rate of VAT i.e. the purchasing power of 
the average person or household would not be affected. A large amount 
of tax revenues can be collected by a determined effort to challenge 
tax avoidance/evasion and its designers. They can also be collected by 
curbing waste. Currently, the government gives a large number of tax 
reliefs without any idea of their contribution of the economy. A thorough 
scrutiny of tax reliefs can generate resources. Some tax reliefs, such 
as tax relief on pension contributions, mainly go to the richer people. 
A recalibration of the pension contributions tax relief not only secures 
fairness but also generates additional revenues for social development.
The UK can also generate resources by broadening its tax base. 
Financial transactions tax and an inequality tax are just two such 
examples. The list of taxes highlighted in this chapter is not exhaustive 
and the state could consider changes to inheritance tax, carbon tax, 
sugar tax, flight tax and additional stamp duty on second homes, 
windfall taxes on banks and much more. The possibilities are only 
constrained by the ideology of the government of the day and its desire 
to rebuild society. 
Lord Prem Sikka is Professor of Accounting at the University of 
Sheffield, and is Emeritus Professor of Accounting at the University of 
Essex.
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            Thames Water 
operated through a labyrinth 
of companies, with some 
linked to Caymans. 
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            Regional disparities 
are already greater in the 
UK than in other comparable 
countries in Europe, 
including Germany despite 
it being split in two for 40 
years. 
Levelling up without the 
EU Structural Funds  
Chapter 9
Olivier Sykes
Introduction
Since the 1930s, the UK has pursued different forms of regional policy to 
try and address the chronic challenge of uneven development between 
its regions.1 As mentioned in chapter two, the framing and forms of 
policy used to address regional inequality have waxed and waned 
through the decades; from the Barlow Report of the 1940s through to 
the Northern Powerhouse of the 2010s. The present UK government 
with its apparent desire to promote a ‘levelling up’ agenda is only the 
latest administration to promise to act decisively regarding these 
longstanding issues. The UK’s retreat from the EU creates a new context 
for this regarding differential impacts on the economic geography of the 
UK and major change to the policy frameworks which have previously 
supported the development of regions.
What’s new about ‘levelling up?
The stated ambition of levelling up and any associated measures 
developed to support this do not exist in a historical and empirical 
vacuum. The legacy of regional policy in the UK both pre- and post- 
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EEC/EU accession is one from which lessons and principles can be 
drawn. In the 1970s, the UK working with other EEC countries played 
a key role in the Europeanisation of regional policy. In 1973, the Scot, 
George Thomson, was appointed as the first Commissioner for Regional 
Policy. The Thomson Report of 1974 made a ‘moral, environmental 
and economic case for a Community regional policy’ when analysing 
regional imbalances in Europe.2 It identified issues in agriculturally 
dominated areas, like Ireland and the Italian Mezzogiorno, and those 
of industrial change and structural underemployment like parts of the 
UK and Belgium. Tellingly, many of the areas of the UK which needed 
support then are the very same as those whose development is now 
seen as central to the ‘levelling up’ agenda. 
Following the Thomson Report, the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) was set-up in 1975. Although it only represented 4% of 
the Community Budget in 1976, this was a significant step towards 
the EU Cohesion Policy we know today, which represents a far greater 
proportion of the EU budget. Since then various iterations of European 
regional policy have played a significant role in the UK, again in many 
of the places now seen as central to the ‘levelling up’ agenda. Similarly, 
in the 1980s the UK played a decisive role in the creation of the Single 
European Market which also made some of these places attractive to 
overseas investment, notably in the car industry.
EU support has not just been significant in quantitative financial terms 
but has also boosted governance and local and regional development in 
more qualitative ways. The stability of multiannual funding programmes 
has fostered the capacity to define local development agendas with 
greater certainty that resources will be available to deliver these. It has 
also enabled places to engage in negotiations with other actors, e.g. 
national government and the private sector. These attributes have been 
particularly significant in the context of the austerity of the 2010s.3 
Engagement with the European context has also been a driver of 
much thinking about city regions in England, including that of central 
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government. Research has demonstrated that ‘countries that have high-
performing cities beyond the capital city also have higher-performing and 
better balanced economies.’4 In some places EU Cohesion Policy support 
has been transformational, providing resources and driving change of a 
scale and vision beyond that contemplated by domestic policy. 
For example, the 2000-2006 EU Objective 1 programme saw £840 
million flow into Merseyside, which coupled with ‘match funding’ gave a 
total investment of over £1 billion over 6-7 years.5 The current Liverpool 
City Region devolution deal by contrast is worth £900 million over a 
time frame of thirty years. Michael Parkinson concludes that for a place 
like Liverpool ‘the sheer scale of EU Objective 1 funding caused a step-
change in its confidence and gave its leaders the stability of funding 
over a long period to plan for change’.6 This contribution of ESIFs to 
place-based development is important to bear in mind, notably as 
wider assessments of their aggregate economic impact in wealthier EU 
members states such as the UK have sometimes been rather dismissive 
(arguably missing the point about the purpose of such policy).7 
What will replace the EU structural funds in the UK?
As noted by the Institute for Government the political declaration on 
the future UK–EU relationship does not envisage the UK continuing 
to contribute to – or receive – EU Structural Funds after the end of 
the transition period on 31 December 2020.8  The era of European 
regional policy in the UK is thus over, at least for duration of the next 
programming period. The 2017 Conservative General Election Manifesto 
promised the creation of a so-called ‘UK Shared Prosperity Fund’ 
(UKSPF) to replace existing EU Cohesion Policy programmes. Some 
consultation has taken place on this, but it is fair to say that there 
has been a general lack of information, certainly in the public domain, 
regarding the UKSPF. Moreover, there has been little indication of how 
much support UKSPF may deliver in lieu of foregone EU Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESIFs). Philip Brien succinctly outlines the ‘logic’ 
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behind the notion of the UKSPF, whilst noting that things may prove 
more complicated and contingent in practice: 
Because the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget, it would in 
theory be possible to reallocate some of the money that currently 
goes to the EU into the Shared Prosperity Fund with no further impact 
on the public purse. In practice, this is unlikely to be the case – the 
economic impact of Brexit may mean that there is less money to go 
around, and there are already several interests competing for a share 
of this money.”9
“
Whilst there has been little clarity from the UK government on the shape 
and scale of the proposed UKSPF, a range of stakeholders including 
the devolved governments, local government, MPs, and others with 
an interest in the consequences of exiting the EU Cohesion Policy 
framework, have been setting out what they would want to see in a 
future regional policy model. Key themes which have emerged are:
1. Funding should be provided at an equivalent level to that foregone by 
the UK’s EU exit. 
2. The multi-annual programming periods which were seen as a key 
advantage of EU structural and investment funds (ESIFs) in fostering 
capacity for long term planning should be retained.
3. Governance arrangements should maintain and enhance the scope 
for autonomous place-based agenda setting which was generated 
by access to ESIFs. Namely, there should be further devolution. 
Relatedly, there is a desire, notably (but not only), on the part of the 
devolved nations to avoid any (re)centralisation of the processes for 
distributing and accessing funds.
4. There is a general desire to see increased flexibility to tailor spending 
towards the specific needs and opportunities of local areas (the 
‘place-based’ v. thematic/sectoral concentration debate – see 
below).
5. Some stakeholders wish to see other measures alongside GDP per 
capita being used to determine need and funding allocations e.g. 
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data on deprivation.
6. Many stakeholders have called for the administrative load 
associated with accessing and managing funding to be lightened. 
Perhaps inevitably, the challenge of how funds should be allocated 
across the territories of the UK has emerged as a sensitive issue. 
Further exacerbated by a wider context in which the EU exit has 
destabilised the ‘delicate mix of constructive ambiguities and balances’ 
which underpin the devolution settlements.10  
Awaiting the launch of the UKSPF other initiatives have taken shape. 
The Stronger Towns fund which originated around March 2019 when 
PM Theresa May was seeking to garner support for her EU Withdrawal 
Agreement from certain northern Labour MPs. With £1.6 billion the 
fund was intended to ‘boost growth and give communities a greater 
say in their future after Brexit.’  However, local representatives and 
policymakers in some areas quickly observed that this sum was a drop 
in the ocean compared to the funding cuts of the austerity decade which 
have hit many disadvantaged places and people hardest.11 
Furthermore, Government and academic predictions suggest that 
‘Brexit’ - especially a no deal scenario, would also be most negative for 
such areas,12 and that it is the ‘Midlands and the North of England which 
are by far the most vulnerable’ as they are ‘more exposed to Brexit than 
any other region in Europe’  being ‘much more dependent on EU markets 
for their trade than London, the South-East or Scotland.’13 When coupled 
with the foregone future EU funding opportunities, it was little wonder 
that one former senior civil servant is alleged to have described the 
Stronger Towns fund as a ‘peashooter initiative.’ Perhaps showing some 
governmental cognisance of this, later in 2019 the fund was increased 
to £3.6 billion to support an initial 100 towns and was rebranded to the 
‘Towns Fund.’14
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More advanced in its development than the UKSPF, is the UK Industrial 
Strategy (IS) which the government has linked to the ‘levelling up’ 
agenda.15  Groups such as the Industrial Communities Alliance (ICA) 
have commented that ‘an industrial strategy is welcome and should be 
of benefit to older industrial areas, where much of what remains of UK 
manufacturing is still located.’16 However, they also note that ‘it would 
be wrong to assume that industrial strategy is a substitute for regional 
policy’. In particular, there some concerns that a place-blind approach 
could inadvertently reinforce existing patterns of uneven development.  
The prospectus on Local Industrial Strategies (LiSs) argues that they 
will allow places to make ‘the most of their distinctive strengths … and 
ensure greater collaboration across boundaries […so that…] all places 
are able to increase productivity and realise their potential.’17  Crucially, 
however, this work is expected to remain aligned with the UK IS – 
leading to questions on the extent to which some areas can capitalise 
on the opportunities presented. The LiS prospectus does acknowledge 
that some places may be better able than others to use their ‘distinctive 
strengths to meet the Industrial Strategy’s Grand Challenges.’ And yet, 
the expectation that local areas must nonetheless align with the UK IS 
may potentially constrain the capacity to tailor interventions to the local 
context, something which is often seen as key to the success of place-
based development. 
An analysis of education levels and the strength of existing industrial 
sectors in the first wave mayoral combined authorities,18 suggests 
that in many of these areas there is a critical gap between the sectoral 
focus of the UK IS, the LiSs which were brought forward as a vehicle 
to spatialise this agenda, and the needs of the ‘levelling up’ agenda. 
Essentially, the areas with strengths around the sectors and ‘Grand 
Challenges’ which are promoted by the UK IS and that are expected 
to be picked-up in LiSs are not necessarily those that are often 
characterised as ‘left behind’, ‘places that don’t matter’, or in need of 
‘levelling up.’19  This challenge within the UK, echoes discussion around 
Le
ve
llin
g 
up
 w
ith
ou
t s
tru
ct
ur
al
 fu
nd
s 
 1
33
What it will really take to level up
the ‘smart specialisation’ steer on the EU’s Cohesion Policy.20 This was 
seen by some as reducing place-based focus and the scope to tailor 
programmes and spending to the characteristics and ‘territorial capital/
potential’ of places. Despite the rhetoric which accompanied the launch 
of the UKSPF claiming that this would be better targeted than existing 
ESIF programmes, the suite of initiatives taking shape in the UK now is 
arguably failing to modify practice in a way that addresses such issues.  
The current picture in the UK
The fact that an internet search on ‘UK SPF’ currently returns many links 
about the ‘Sun Protection Factor’ of sun creams available in the UK, perhaps 
tells its own story. In the March 2020 Budget, the Government did reaffirm 
its commitment to ‘at a minimum, match current levels of funding to each 
nation from EU structural funds.’ Philip Brien notes that this should mean that 
‘No nation of the UK should therefore lose out relative to the current level of 
funding it receives’ whilst pointing out that ‘we do not yet have any information 
on how funding will be distributed within each nation.’21 Since then the 
Government has said that ‘the design for the Fund will be finalised following 
the 2020 Comprehensive Spending Review, and that it will “support local 
economic recovery by driving economic growth and tackling deprivation.”’22
Despite these statements there is growing unease amongst concerned 
stakeholders at the apparent lack of progress. The Welsh Affairs Committee 
in Parliament noted in October 2020 that ‘there is still no substantive detail 
from UK ministers about their plans and a range of issues remain unsolved’ 
and called for ‘urgent reassurance’ on the new fund to avoid a ‘cliff-edge to 
EU funds from January 2021.’23 Similarly, the Scottish Government has called 
for the UK Government to reinstate cancelled talks on the UKSPF against 
a background of concern in the devolved nations at ‘the lack of information 
on how the UKSPF will work and what its value will be.’24  The Scottish 
Government is also seeking assurances that ‘funding decisions will be fully 
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devolved, matching the way EU structural funds are currently managed.’ 
Scottish Investment Minister, Ivan McKee, has further emphasised 
in a letter to Minister of State for Housing, Communities and Local 
Government Minister, Luke Hall, that ‘European structural funds have 
played a vital role in supporting Scotland’s economic and social policy 
aims.’25  Also, the letter stated that, ‘To keep the Scottish Government and 
the other devolved nations at arm’s length during the development of the 
replacement  to the EU structural funds, which will play an important role 
in our economic recovery from Covid-19, is both counterproductive and 
potentially detrimental to the future success of the Fund.’ In addition, the 
proposed Internal Market Bill will also empower the UK Government to 
make payments for the purposes of economic development within the 
devolved nations in areas of devolved competence.26 This is resisted by 
the devolved governments who sense a drift towards politicisation and 
that there is a potential for centralisation around the newly emerging 
regional policy arrangements (see reported plans to emblazon the Union 
Flag on projects in Scotland).27
The uncertainty of the government’s plans, or lack thereof, has many 
effects, not just impacting planning by public authorities, but also 
current ESIF project beneficiaries i.e. voluntary sector organisations.28 
Some of these have been able to benefit from ESIFs to support their 
responses to Covid-19 and would have had greater certainty around 
their post-pandemic recovery actions in their communities had the UK 
remained in the EU, and thus, eligible for ESIFs.
Finally, in designing and resourcing the UKSPF, another issue which 
is easy to forget is that ESIF support through ERDF and ESF funding 
typically required match funding by the national Government under 
the so-called ‘additionality’ principle. This meant that whatever the final 
amount of the UKSPF, there is also the issue of whether the sums 
available will be similar to the total leveraged by the EU programmes. 
Already there is past experience of UK government failing to, or only 
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grudgingly, agreeing to provide ‘match’ to unlock opportunities to access 
EU funding e.g. in the fisheries sector, or regarding funding to support 
former coalfield areas. As noted by Brien, ‘If the Shared Prosperity Fund 
aims to result in similar levels of investment as the ESI, then those 
designing the fund will need to consider the total amount of investment 
enabled by ESI funds, rather than just the amount provided by the EU’ 
and that ‘It would also be valuable to look at whether the existing match 
funding structures should be integrated with the Fund in some way.’29  
The recent shelving of plans to offer longer term budgetary certainty to 
local authorities, also muddies the financial waters further.30
Is the UK being left behind? The current picture in 
the EU 
In the meantime, the process of reforming and preparing ESIF 
programmes for the 2021 -2027 has been continuing apace.  The 
principles, debates, trade-offs and resolutions which will define the post-
2021 EU Cohesion Policy are relatively easy to ascertain and are largely 
in the public domain. The wider EU financial picture has also evolved 
significantly with the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), joined 
by a specific Recovery measure titled, Next Generation EU (NGEU). A 
key development is that the European Commission is ‘authorised to 
borrow funds on behalf of the Union on the capital markets’31 with the 
proceeds being ‘transferred to Union programmes in accordance with 
NGEU.’32  Heading 2 of the MFF for 2021-2027 is, “Cohesion, Resilience 
and Values,” Under Sub-Heading 2a, ‘Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion EU Cohesion Policy will receive about €330 billion for the 
2021 to 2027 programming period.’33 Funds will be allocated to regions 
(NUTS level 2) on the ‘basis of how their GDP per capita, measured in 
purchasing power standards (PPS)’ for the period 2015-2017, compared 
to the average GDP of the EU-27 for the same period, according to 
the following classification which will be broadly familiar to those with 
knowledge of previous Cohesion Policy cycles:
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• less developed regions, whose GDP per capita is less than 75% of 
the average GDP of the EU-27;
• transition regions, whose GDP per capita is between 75% and 100% 
of the average GDP of the EU-27;
• more developed regions, whose GDP per capita is above 100% of the 
average GDP of the EU-27.
In addition, the Cohesion Fund will support those Member States 
whose gross national income (GNI) per capita, measured in PPS and 
calculated on the basis of Union figures over the 2015-2017 period, is 
less than 90% of the average GNI per capita of the EU-27. To ‘level up’ 
the less developed regions should continue to receive the highest share 
of funding and ‘he calculations of regional GDP account for about 81% 
of the distribution formula with a variety of other indicators based on 
social, economic and - to a lesser extent - territorial characteristics of 
European regions also being used.’34
The EU Commission has not produced an official assessment of 
what UK regions could have received had the UK remained a full EU 
member state, or continued participating in EU Cohesion Policy in some 
other configuration of EU-UK relationship. However, the Conference 
of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR)35 produced an indicative 
figure in two reports published in January and October 2019.36 These 
suggested that had the UK remained in the EU, its regions could have 
been in line to receive approximately €13 billion of EU Cohesion Policy 
funding in the 2021-2027 period. This would compare with the €10.6 
billion it was allocated in the 2014 – 2020 period. This was a result of the 
sobering fact that, once again, many areas of the UK are falling behind 
the EU average in terms of regional prosperity. Of particular significance 
to the ‘levelling up’ agenda the CPMR estimated that, ‘The share of 
funding earmarked for regions considered as ‘less developed regions’ 
in the UK would rise from about EUR 2.7bn from the current period 
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The latest data indicate that at least six regions could in fact be clas-
sified as less developed regions in the next framework period (Tees 
Valley and Durham, South Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Cornwall and Isles 
of Scilly, West Wales and the Valleys, and Southern Scotland). The 
‘Outer London – East and North East’ region is also on the borderline 
for this classification.”38
“
Moreover, the analysis noted that, ‘this does not necessarily mean 
that these regions would have received the amount calculated by the 
CPMR.’ This is because, ‘First, the amounts received are always subject 
to negotiation,’ and ‘Secondly, the allocations proposed by the EU for 
the next framework period assume that the UK will have left the EU 
at that point; if it had remained, the negotiations may have proceeded 
differently.’ However, both the CPMR and House of Commons Library 
concur that more UK regions would have been classified as ‘less 
developed regions’ in the UK under the EU Cohesion Policy in the 2021 
– 2027 period than in the 2014 – 2020. This would have meant more 
resources even if the exact figure can be debated and the distribution 
within the UK would have reflected domestic influence too. The 
CPMR figure was cited in Parliament on 26 June 2019 in a debate on 
‘Replacement of EU structural funds for less developed regions.’39 Three 
years after the EU referendum and over two years after the UKSPF was 
first mooted during the 2017 General Election campaign, and in the 
vacuum created by the lack of progress since, parliamentarians seized 
the opportunity to finally debate some figures.
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(2014 – 2020), to EUR 4.4bn in the next programming period (from 2021 
to 2027).’ In this context, ‘The two regions classed as ‘less developed 
regions’ in the current period - Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly and West 
Wales and the Valleys - would stand to receive a significant share of the 
UK allocation of Cohesion Policy.’37  Analysis by the House of Commons 
Library (May 2020) suggests that:
What it will really take to level up
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Conclusion
Regional disparities are already greater in the UK than in other 
comparable countries in Europe, including Germany despite it being split 
in two for 40 years.40  Worryingly, the ‘great majority of available evidence 
suggests that Brexit is likely to make the UK’s interregional inequalities 
worse than they already are.’41 Leaving the EU introduces new uncertainty 
and friction into trade and depletes market potential for many of the least 
prosperous UK regions. Despite this and the rhetoric about ‘levelling up’ 
regions, or ‘turbocharging’ regional growth, there is still little information 
in the public domain about what will replace the EU’s longstanding 
structural investment support for UK regions and nations.  
 
The UKSPF has been touted since before the 2017 election, but there is 
still little information about it in the public domain. Though there have 
been some more modest initiatives like the Stronger Towns/Towns 
Fund, what is lacking is an indication of the more comprehensive 
and integrated approach to place-based development which will be 
needed if ‘levelling up’ is to be seriously addressed. This impression 
of ad hocery is reinforced when Parliamentary scrutiny suggests that 
the government department administering the Towns Fund42 has ‘not 
been open about the process it followed and it did not disclose the 
reasoning for selecting or excluding towns;’ and that ‘It is still far from 
clear what impact the Department expects from the Towns Fund, when 
it expects to see the benefits, and how it will measure success both at 
the town level and across the whole programme.’43 It is not clear either 
that other policies like the UK IS and its local iterations will support 
growth in a way that doesn’t create more ‘winning and losing’ among 
regions. Questions remain about how well-tailored new Local Industrial 
Strategies (LISs) aligned to national sectoral goals will be to the place-
based potential of different territories.44
 
What it will really take to level up
Leaving the EU modifies the opportunity structures of place-based 
policy, given the large role that the EU has played in regional policy in 
the UK over the past 40 years.45  European regional policy (ironically 
strongly pushed by the UK when it joined the EEC in the 1970s) has 
played a key role in  sustaining reflection on the chronic problem of 
uneven regional development in the UK, and obliging stakeholders, 
including central government, to sit around the table and think about it. 
The EISFs provided valued support to the UK’s less developed regions 
and were transformational in some settings. The key advantages being 
cited as: longer funding cycles than those which are typical domestically, 
which provided certainty and allowed longer term planning; the sense 
of ‘ownership’ of a dedicated place-based funding stream independent 
from UK government centralisation and political calculation; and, positive 
impacts on governance confidence and capacity. 
 
There has been talk of building on such legacies whilst better targeting 
regional aid to places, increasing flexibility, and reducing administrative 
burdens. However, these positive features are arguably already being lost 
in the uncertainty about funding totals, timetables, and management.  
As Giordano comments, ‘The danger is that the key lessons from the 
ERDF will not be capitalised upon; even worse, the domestic governance 
system through which the funding is implemented will be effectively 
dismantled’ with a further ‘risk that any new domestic regional policy 
will suffer from a lack of adequate funding compared to what the UK 
would have been allocated via EU Cohesion Policy, if Brexit had not 
happened.’46 In the face of this, at the time of writing (October 2020) 
stakeholders are expressing their concern about the lack of information 
about the organisation and scale of the proposed UKSPF in increasingly 
robust terms. The policy vacuum is straining already taut relations 
between UK territories and may also exacerbate surging mistrust and 
tension between regions and the centre within England (cf. recent stand-
offs between English devolved city-regions and the centre).47  Some 
observers clearly detect the spectre of re-centralisation and of politicised 
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rather than comprehensive place-based policy floating above the scene. 
The spirit of territorial cohesion which underpinned EU Cohesion Policy 
feels rather distant.
 
On a less ‘political’ level we should not forget that behind all this are the 
beneficiaries of ESIF programmes who must now plan for the future 
in face of uncertainty around the new arrangements and the ongoing 
pandemic. Another important issue is that the EISFs leveraged ‘match 
funding.’ Unless the UKSPF monies are to be equivalent to foregone 
ESIFs in 2021 – 2027 plus ‘the match’ that these would have unlocked, 
then other funding streams will have to be found to ensure that the 
government promise to regions they that will not lose out is kept. 
 
Meanwhile, the post-2021 EU Cohesion Policy picture is now clearer, 
delivering greater certainty for places in the EU than that enjoyed 
by their counterparts in the UK (dependent on the agreement of the 
next EU MFF).  Different analysts agree there would have been more 
regions which qualify as ‘less developed regions’ in the UK under the 
EU Cohesion Policy in the 2021 – 2027 period than in the 2014 – 2020 
period. This would have meant more resources, even if the exact figure 
can be debated and the distribution within the UK would have reflected 
domestic influence too. 
Aside from funding guarantees up to the increasingly imminent closure 
of EU programmes in the UK, the key picture overall is one of uncertainty. 
The issue of addressing uneven development and reducing disparities 
in the UK has so far been showered with more rhetoric than resources 
by the government. There seems to be little awareness on its part that it 
is not the first administration to perceive and promise to address these 
issues, or acknowledgement that its central geopolitical project is likely 
to further exacerbate the problem. Against this backdrop, if it is really 
serious about ‘levelling up,’ the Government might do well to heed the 
words of A. J. Brown writing in 1973:
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There is no indication that the tendencies towards disparities of re-
gional growth or the forces behind them have slackened or are likely 
to do so…. If regional disparities very substantially stronger than we 
have experienced since the war are to be avoided some sort of re-
gional policy is certainly necessary…. The need for regional policy is 
not simply a regrettable aspect of a temporary economic sickness – a 
view that the British have been disposed to take of their economic 
problems for at least fifty years. It is a normal part of the life of any 
economic community that likes (or even tolerates) change but has the 
humanity to recognise that the economy was made for man and not 
man for the economy.”48
“
Olivier Sykes is a Lecturer in European Spatial Planning at the University of 
Liverpool.
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